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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The work presented in this report is an outcome from the Land & Water Australia funded 
project Pathways to good practice in regional NRM governance. This interdisciplinary 
and collaborative project was conceived to assess the effectiveness of regional natural 
resource management (NRM) governance and to develop a standard for good-practice 
NRM governance. The work is focussed on nine regions across Tasmania (Cradle Coast, 
South), Victoria (Corangamite, North Central, Goulburn Broken) and NSW (Central 
West, Murray, Lachlan, Northern Rivers), as well as the state jurisdictions of NSW, 
Victoria and Tasmania and the national level. 
 
In this report, we assess the strengths and challenges of NRM governance in our nine 
partner regions, as well as the state and national levels, against eight governance 
principles and related themes. We undertake this task using (i) 55 interviews with key 
players from our partner regions, and associated government jurisdictions; and (ii) a 
review of the related literature. We synthesise our empirical data with insights from the 
literature and analyse the common ground and discrepancies between them. From this, 
we reach the following conclusions about the current strengths and challenges of NRM 
governance. Note that these conclusions principally apply to the nine partner regions and 
related state jurisdictions, as well as certain aspects of Australian Government 
involvement in the system. We do not make any claims about their applicability to the 47 
other regional NRM bodies and other state and territory jurisdictions. 
 
1.  The legitimacy of the regional NRM system is moderate. 
• Regional NRM bodies are faced with managing tensions between legitimacy 
conferred on them by governments, and a perceived need to be recognised as 
separate from government in order to earn legitimacy from their communities. 
• Autonomy is a real concern as a result of insufficient devolution of powers to 
regional NRM bodies by the Australian and some state governments. Equally, 
regional NRM bodies need to recognise and respect the legitimacy of 
governments’ roles in the multilayer NRM governance system. 
• Greater devolution should not exempt governments representing extra-regional 
interests or addressing national and international concerns and obligations. 
• Personal integrity of the key players appears sound, with the commitment of 
regional decision makers and some stakeholders, a key strength. 
• Processes and responses to ‘conflict of interest’ issues are sound, and probity-
related matters are being effectively managed through codes of practice and 
training. 
• Questions linger over the genuineness of some governments’ commitment to 
NRM. 
 
2.  The transparency of regional NRM bodies is strong. 
• A range of communication and reporting media is used, often targeted to 
particular audiences and needs. 
• Regions that are less mature or relatively resource-poor recognise a need for 
improvement. 
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3.  The accountability of the regional NRM system is moderate. 
• Upward accountability of regional NRM bodies to government is well established 
and continues to be strengthened. 
• Reporting requirements imposed by governments are generally perceived to be 
unnecessarily complex and demanding. 
• Role clarity is a key accountability weakness, both at a systems level and for 
particular NRM activities (water, native vegetation and pest plant and animal 
management). 
• Clarification of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities is needed (i) for all 
organizations involved in Australian NRM; and (ii) on the status and functions of 
the various strategic plans and operational instruments. 
• Downward accountability of regional NRM bodies to their communities is 
required for democratic NRM governance, suggesting a need to continue 
strengthening earned legitimacy and inclusive governance practices. 
 
4.  The inclusiveness of the regional NRM system is moderate. 
• All participants are strongly committed to inclusive governance, which is 
considered by some regions to be a strength of the system. 
• Establishing effective engagement with several key stakeholders – Indigenous 
communities, ‘care’ groups, local governments, agribusiness, urban and 
environmental constituencies – remains a significant challenge. 
• Engagement of regional actors in higher-level processes is currently inadequate – 
inclusion of regional NRM representatives in higher-level coordination and 
decision-making is a desirable governance reform. 
• Wider societal and environmental concerns tend to be under-represented at the 
regional level – this demands a strengthening of the system as a whole, as it is at 
the state and national levels where such concerns are best represented and 
pursued. 
 
5.  The fairness of regional NRM bodies is moderate to strong. 
• Decision-making procedures generally ensure consistency and absence of bias in 
decision-making. 
• The tension between a strategic approach and the disproportionate allocation of 
NRM benefits across areas and sectors remains a concern. 
• The use of formal procedures to track, justify and communicate the distribution of 
costs and benefits arising from NRM decisions is desirable. 
• More effective conflict management would improve governance fairness. 
• Fostering a culture of mutual respect, active listening and honesty, where lack of 
distortion, manipulation and deception are the norm, would assist fairness. 
 
6.  The integration of the regional NRM system is weak to moderate. 
• Alignment of broad NRM direction across national, state and regional levels 
generally appears sound. 
• Inadequate vertical and horizontal connection and coordination is leading to sub-
optimal system-wide performance. 
• Integration of NRM policy and action across national, state and regional levels is 
patchy, and where present, often superficial. 
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• National and state leadership is required to bring all the efforts into a coordinated 
program that is delivering significant large-scale outcomes. 
• Horizontal integration between CMAs is patchy, but strengthening, although 
competition between regions remains a barrier. 
• Effective partnerships and projects between regional NRM bodies and with other 
regional NRM providers are being developed. 
• The tensions and contradictions of operating in a competitive business 
environment and the imperative for partnership building are ongoing governance 
challenges for regional NRM bodies. 
 
7.  The capability of the regional NRM system is moderate to weak. 
• Regional NRM bodies generally have well-established business systems, and 
those that do have deficiencies are making it a priority to remedy the 
shortcomings. 
• Board and staff members of regional NRM bodies are generally high calibre and 
experienced, though remote and chronically under-resourced regions are 
disadvantaged. 
• The level of investment in NRM continues to produce a significant capability 
deficit, but even more important is the manner in which funding is delivered and 
constrained by governments – more durable and flexible funding arrangements 
are needed. 
• Knowledge management systems are generally of limited effectiveness and in 
some cases poorly developed – knowledge management is a major long-term 
challenge for governments, research providers and regional NRM bodies. 
 
8.  The adaptability of the regional NRM system is moderate to weak. 
• System-level adaptability is made difficult by cumbersome and time consuming 
amendment processes, institutional fragmentation and related transboundary 
issues, tensions between competing interests, and poorly integrated knowledge 
generation and management. 
• Few regions have fully operational systems to make them learning organizations. 
State and national level processes are also under-developed. 
• Current and emerging monitoring, evaluation and review systems adequately 
provide for accountability but are insufficient to enable an operational adaptive 
management capacity. 
• Governments need to provide leadership in developing adaptive capability while 
all organizations have to tackle current antagonistic cultural and institutional 
conditions. 
 
While the governance weaknesses indicated above need to be acknowledged and 
addressed, they do not constitute fatal flaws in the structure of the current multi-level 
model of regional delivery. The overwhelming view of those interviewed, and one with 
which we concur, is that the regional model is generally sound and should be allowed 
time to fulfil its potential. For this to occur, however, significant advances are required in 
aspects of system and regional level governance, particular those related to integration, 
capability and adaptability. In this regard, we note that there appears to be a high level of 
commitment to the regional NRM approach and a willingness to meet these challenges. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The work presented in this paper is an outcome from the Land & Water Australia funded 
project Pathways to good practice in regional NRM governance. This interdisciplinary 
and collaborative project was conceived to assess the effectiveness of regional NRM 
(natural resource management) governance and to develop a standard for good-practice 
NRM governance. The work is focussed on nine regions across Tasmania (Cradle Coast, 
South), Victoria (Corangamite, North Central, Goulburn Broken) and NSW (Central 
West, Murray, Lachlan, Northern Rivers), as well as the state jurisdictions of NSW, 
Victoria and Tasmania and the national level. 
 
The project objectives are to: 
 
1. establish a theoretically robust understanding of good regional NRM governance; 
2. develop a set of principles for good regional NRM governance; 
3. describe regional NRM governance arrangements and structures, with particular 
reference to our nine partner regions; 
4. assess the quality of NRM governance in our nine partner regions, as well as the 
state and national levels, against our governance principles and related themes; 
5. identify aspects of regional NRM governance that should be targeted for 
improvement in our nine partner regions as well as the state and national levels; 
and  
6. develop a standard for good regional NRM governance that can be used to 
benchmark and track governance performance. 
 
This report addresses Objectives 4 and 5. It presents the outcomes from qualitative 
interviews that provide descriptive data on the quality of NRM governance in our nine 
partner regions, as well as state and national levels. These data are organised according to 
the governance principles developed in the project, as well as a number of subsidiary 
themes. The development of the principles is described in Davidson et al. (2006). 
 
Since publication of this report, the principles therein have been further refined through 
consultation with our research partners and subsequent re-consideration by the research 
team. More details on the process used to develop the principles are given in Lockwood 
et al. (2007). The eight principles are as follows: 
 
Principle 1. Legitimacy 
Legitimacy refers to (i) the validity of an organization’s authority to govern that may be 
(a) conferred by democratic statute; or (b) earned through the acceptance by stakeholders 
of an organization’s authority to govern; and (ii) the integrity and commitment with 
which this authority is exercised. 
 
Principle 2. Transparency 
Transparency refers to (i) the visibility of decision-making processes; (ii) the clarity with 
which the reasoning behind decisions is communicated; and (iii) the ready availability of 
relevant information about the governance and performance of an organization. 
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Principle 3. Accountability 
Accountability refers to (i) the allocation and acceptance of responsibility for decisions 
and actions; and (ii) the demonstration of how these responsibilities have been met. 
 
Principle 4. Inclusiveness 
Inclusiveness refers to the opportunities available for stakeholders to participate in and 
influence decision-making processes. 
 
Principle 5. Fairness 
Fairness refers to (i) the respect and attention given to stakeholders’ views; (ii) 
consistency and absence of personal bias in decision-making; and (iii) the consideration 
given to distribution of costs and benefits of decisions. 
 
Principle 6. Integration 
Integration refers to (i) the connection between, and coordination across, different levels 
of government; (ii) the connection between, and coordination across, organizations at the 
same level of governance; and (iii) the alignment of visions and strategic directions 
across governance organizations. 
 
Principle 7. Capability 
Capability refers to the systems, resources, skills, leadership, knowledge and experience 
that enable organizations, and the individuals who direct, manage and work for them, to 
deliver on their responsibilities. 
 
Principle 8. Adaptability 
Adaptability refers to (i) the incorporation of new knowledge and learning into decision-
making and implementation; (ii) anticipation and management of threats, opportunities 
and associated risks; and (iii) systematic self-reflection on organizational performance. 
 
In the next section, we describe the method used to collect and analyse information from 
interviews with our partners on the strengths and challenges of regional NRM 
governance. Results from the interviews are given in Section 3. In Section 4, we then 
present a short review of the academic literature that has examined the Australian 
regional NRM experiment. A synthesis of our empirical data with insights from the 
literature is given in Section 5, where we analyse the common ground and discrepancies 
between the empirical and academic material. In Section 6, we offer conclusions about 
the current strengths and weaknesses of NRM governance in our partner regions as well 
as in the related state and national jurisdictions. 
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2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
Data for Section 3 of this report were collected using a series of qualitative interviews 
held with representatives from our nine partner regions, as well as the state jurisdictions 
of NSW, Victoria and Tasmania and the national level. Representatives from the board 
and staff of the following regional NRM bodies were interviewed: 
 
• Corangamite Catchment Management Authority (CMA); 
• North Central CMA; 
• Goulburn Broken CMA; 
• Murray CMA; 
• Lachlan CMA; 
• Central West CMA; 
• Northern Rivers CMA; 
• Cradle Coast NRM; and  
• NRM South. 
 
Interviews were also held with NRM staff from the NSW, Victorian, Tasmanian and 
Australian Governments, as well as with an advisor operating at the national level. The 
selection of participants, interview schedule and handling of data were approved by the 
University of Tasmania Human Research Ethics Committee. Consistent with the 
approved procedure, this report preserves the anonymity of participants. A total of 55 
participants were interviewed. Participants are referred to according to a code based on 
whether they operate at regional, state or national levels and, if the regional level, 
whether they are a board member or staff of the regional NRM body. A numerical 
subscript is used to indicate where more than one participant was interviewed from a 
particular category. The participant codes are as follows: 
 
• NB1 to NB8  NSW Regional Body Board 
• NS1 to NS11  NSW Regional Body Staff 
• NG1   NSW Government 
• VB1 to VB7  Victorian Regional Body Board 
• VS1 to VS8  Victorian Regional Body Staff 
• VG1   Victorian Government 
• TB1 to TB7  Tasmanian Regional Body Board 
• TS1 to TS6  Tasmanian Regional Body or Regional Authority Staff 
• TG1 to TG2  Tasmanian Government 
• AG1 to AG3  Australian Government 
• AA1   Australian Advisor. 
 
Each interview was conducted by two members of the research team. One team member 
asked the questions; the other took notes and recorded the session. Recordings were made 
as a back-up. In the event, the notes were the only data form needed for the analysis. 
Draft transcripts were constructed from the notes, and sent to the participants for 
checking. Several participants made amendments to the draft transcripts of their 
interviews. In these cases, a revised transcript was produced. Most interviews were with 
one participant, with several group interviews also conducted at the request of members 
of the participating regions. 
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The interview format and question schedule were pre-tested with the Tasmanian regional 
body, NRM North. As a result, minor adjustments were made to the order and timing of 
the sessions. The final interview schedule is given in Appendix 1. 
 
A content analysis of the interview transcripts proceeded as follows. The research team 
met and, drawing on the overall experience of the interviews, developed a draft set of 
themes under each governance principle. One member of the interview team then 
selected discrete text blocks from each transcript, each of which constituted a single point 
being made by the participant. Each text block was then categorised under a principle and 
theme. Blocks that were difficult to classify were grouped separately. Text blocks not 
related to the research objectives were not included. The initial classification was 
checked by a second member of the interview team, and any differences resolved by the 
team members. The result was a draft spreadsheet of classified text blocks, coded 
according to the corresponding participant. 
 
This draft spreadsheet was then re-analysed by two research team members, who 
allocated a category to the unclassified text blocks, and resolved several inconsistencies 
and inappropriate classifications. By this stage, the original set of principles had been 
revised, so the classification was updated to reflect the final eight principles listed in 
Section 1. During this process, some revisions were also made to the themes. Text blocks 
in the final spreadsheet under each principle and theme were then integrated and 
summarised. 
 
The next section offers a summary of the content analysis, using example text blocks for 
each principle and theme. 
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3.  RESULTS OF PARTICIPANT INTERVIEWS 
 
In all, 1,059 text blocks were identified and classified, first by the principle most closely 
related to the content of the block, and second by a keyword (theme) derived from the 
definitions of each principle given in Section 1. Before going into detail of the 
governance strengths and weaknesses associated with each principle, we first present an 
overview of the emphases given to each principle by the participants, as indicated by the 
relative numbers of text blocks. Examining the breakdown of text blocks by respondent 
groups (total and per-respondent) is also instructive. We then detail the content of 
participants’ comments, organised according to each principle. 
 
Table 1 indicates the number of text blocks per principle, by respondent group. 
Comments regarding the capability, legitimacy and integration dimensions of governance 
predominated. Inclusiveness, adaptability and transparency received a moderate level of 
commentary, while relatively few comments were made about accountability and 
fairness. 
 
Table 1. Number of text blocks per principle, by respondent group 
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Percentage 19 3 9 14 3 18 23 11 100 
 
 
Table 2. Standardised percentage text blocks per principle, by respondent group 
(those above 3% highlighted) 
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NSW Regions 2.9 0.8 1.3 2.6 0.4   1.8 16.8 
NSW Government  1.5  0.0 0.0  0.8 1.5 16.6 
Victorian Regions 1.7 0.4 1.9 1.9 0.4 2.3 	 1.7 13.3 
Victorian Government 2.3 0.0  0.0 0.8   0.8 14.3 
Tasmanian Regions 
 0.3 0.7 1.4 0.5 2.2  1.4 13.6 
Tasmanian Government 2.6 0.0 0.4  0.4   0.4 14.7 
Australian Gov. & Advisor  0.2 0.4 1.3 0.4 2.1 2.3 0.9 10.7 
Total 21.5 3.1 10.7 10.3 2.7 21.8 21.3 8.5 100.0 
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Percentage responses for each respondent group, standardised to account for the relative 
numbers of participants in each group, are given in Table 2. Some interesting differences 
between groups are apparent. NSW government participants mainly made comment on 
legitimacy, integration and transparency, while NSW regions were more concerned with 
capability, as well as integration. Victorian government participants focussed on 
integration, transparency and capability, while Victorian regions emphasised capability. 
Tasmanian government participants highlighted capability, integration and inclusiveness, 
while the regions spoke most about legitimacy, as well as capability. Australian 
Government participants gave emphasis to the legitimacy dimension of governance. The 
state agency participants thus had a common emphasis on integration, and the regions had 
a common emphasis on capability. Transparency was also an important component for 
NSW and Victorian government participants. 
 
Legitimacy 
Keywords: commitment, conferred, earned, integrity 
 
Tasmanian participants noted the relative immaturity of their institutions, and the 
consequent need for strong long-term government support to allow the system to develop 
its potential. There was a concern that if policy changes too rapidly, there is not the 
opportunity for such consolidation and maturation to occur, thereby threatening the 
achievement of outcomes. Tasmanian participants were also concerned about the 
mismatch between government expectations and their level of support. 
 
Policy and institutional change was also raised in NSW, but with more emphasis on the 
relationship between these, durability and legitimacy: “durability and consistency gives 
you legitimacy in the community” (NB2). The need for durability and on-going 
commitment from governments to earn legitimacy for the system was also noted in 
Victorian and NSW regions: 
 
We’ll come and go – CMC [Catchment Management Committee1], CMB 
[Catchment Management Board], CMA – CMZ might be next but we need to 
leave a legacy in the community. The community has to feel that they have a say 
in it all because they are the ones who will make the difference. There will be 
durability in the whole system (NB1). 
 
We are in an industry that is new, that takes a long-time to show results and we 
are into cultural change so we need a lot of consistent and persistent attention. If 
we don't watch out we will be like the agencies in the past where there were lots 
of reports that went nowhere. CMAs must insist on durability of policy and get 
the government to understand that we have a 20 year time-frame (VB1). 
 
The conferred nature of regional NRM bodies’ legitimacy was a source of concern in the 
sense that the regional bodies themselves had no say in their own creation. Legislation 
was also recognised as a two-edged sword. On the one hand it imparted an authority to 
regional planning and action in Victoria and NSW: 
 
                                                 
1Square brackets are used to identify explanatory notes or interpolations made by the authors. 
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Legitimacy: I see that as a strength. We have clear authority under certain Acts 
(VS1). 
 
The legislative base; and roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. As a result 
there is no ambiguity and a lot of stability as a result (NG1). 
 
On the other hand, it necessitated strategies that emphasise a separation from government 
in order to establish community (earned) legitimacy: 
 
It’s about building trust – the link with government is a constraint on the public 
perception. The name ‘authority’ gives the community the wrong impression. Our 
perception is that it is somewhere that they can get advice and information 
whereas they see us as a regulator, as the compliance organization but we call in 
the DNR [the then Department of Natural Resources] to do the regulation (NS3). 
 
There’s a big concern among landowner groups that NRM not be seen as 
government. We don’t have a regulatory role and they don’t want us to do that. 
NRM organizations are a link between community and government (TB3). 
 
The substantial reliance on incentive-based instruments means that earned legitimacy is 
essential to the effective functioning of regional NRM bodies. Again this reliance is seen 
to be both a blessing and a curse: 
 
We don’t have regulatory power – carrots only, no sticks – this has both 
advantages and disadvantages – we could be a bit more responsive to regional 
needs – we could do more regulatory work (TB2). 
 
From a government agency perspective (AG2), state government oversight in those 
jurisdictions with statutory regional NRM bodies makes for a less risky system, reducing 
the likelihood that ‘rogue’ regions pursue a unilateral agenda or become dysfunctional. 
As the system matures, it was also noted that system-wide recognition of a three-way 
national-state-regional partnership is emerging: 
 
Initially they [regional NRM bodies] thought of themselves as completely 
independent and they couldn’t see that they were partners with government. The 
relationship is maturing and heading in the right direction (NG1). 
 
While there was some divergence of opinion, participants generally lamented insufficient 
devolution of powers (as distinct from responsibilities) by governments. Trust was raised 
as a key element by both government and regional participants: 
 
This has been a huge project of letting go for state governments and the 
Australian Government to back the locals – agencies still resent it. Why give all 
this money to a bunch of yokels—we can do a better job? (AG1). 
 
There is resistance by DNR who would rather command and control be given 
back to them. They haven’t got comfortable with devolved governance (NS1). 
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The Memorandum of Understanding with DNR does not give enough recognition 
[to the NSW regional NRM body] as independent authority (NS2). 
 
More independence is the key … We might get some more authority later on – 
we’ve demonstrated enough to earn it (NB3). 
 
[Our region] has a lot of responsibility but doesn’t have the powers it needs – 
you’ve got others looking over your shoulder all the time (TB1). 
 
The Australian Government thinks they are the core – they are not independent 
investors and they influence all along the chain. They devolve but they never let 
go (TB6). 
 
Our biggest challenge is bureaucrats that try to control us. Every time we 
challenge DSE [Department of Sustainability and Environment] they claim we are 
threatening good governance … We have the silly situation where our board is 
constrained in its ability to get on with their job, which is absurd given the quality 
of the board and compared with the staff that they have to report to in DSE (VS2). 
 
At least one region also objected to modifications forced on their Resource Condition 
Strategy (RCS) by state and Australian governments, which undermined the community-
based legitimacy and ownership earned through participatory planning processes: 
 
One of the biggest problems we had last time with our RCS was that we thought 
we were developing a vision driven by our community. The state and 
Commonwealth didn't see this and thought it was their document. But two thirds 
of our catchment is managed by private landholders. Not just that they will be 
asked to do the work, they will also be paying for it. The full document – we 
didn't own it so much in the end as it was tampered with so much. We will want 
to change that next time as that was not a good process (VS7). 
 
However, the level of earned legitimacy, as demonstrated by community acceptance of 
and confidence in regional NRM bodies, is patchy and seen as a key challenge by some 
regions: 
 
The challenge has been to get the confidence of lots of our landholders. We’ve 
taken the line to educate and make direct contact rather than contracting work out 
to Landcare groups although we’re also trying to keep the confidence of these 
groups. That relationship is strained because they see it as us taking away a 
service, that is, a coordinator. What we’ve got to do is give the groups some 
power for themselves (NS1). 
 
Some stakeholders do not have a good understanding of the powers, purposes and 
constitution of regional NRM bodies, while others simply do not know of their existence. 
This lack of awareness constitutes a significant impediment to achieving higher levels of 
earned legitimacy, especially in Tasmania: 
 
People understand state government and community groups but it’s hard to put us 
in a box and define us (TS1). 
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Most farmers would not be aware of NRM – the organization has a branding issue 
(TS2). 
 
Legitimacy may come down to good promotion. Their important role is to bring 
the stakeholders together – it's the first time a particularly broad range of 
stakeholders has been brought together. But the NRM organizations are slow to 
be known and understood (TG1). 
 
Nonetheless, several participants in each jurisdiction consider that community acceptance 
of regional NRM is a strength of the system that is being built through engagement, 
developing effective partnerships, and on-ground achievements: 
 
We’ve held various activities such as field days, which have been well-attended. 
These are an indication of people accepting what we’re about. One on soil 
structure had 150 people attend. People are concerned to look after their soil and 
those things help to legitimise and assist inclusiveness on the terms of the 
stakeholders (TB4). 
 
We had issues with farmers and care groups – we gained that legitimacy by the 
delivery of funds and projects – the stakeholders didn’t know that the process was 
okay until it delivered. Legitimacy comes with outcomes (TB5). 
 
Our legitimacy comes from developing those relationships and developing our 
standing among our partners. We’ve made some real strides in developing those 
partnerships – ensuring our major stakeholders are in the tent – making sure the 
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association and local governments are part of 
what we are. It’s really early days. The legitimacy has to be at the level of 
population support that comes from putting together these coalitions and networks 
(TB3). 
 
We do have the community’s confidence more now than at any time in the past. 
I’ve been around here 15 - 20 years now in NRM and the community and it’s the 
first time that I’ve been in senior management that the organization is not being 
bashed politically (NS5). 
 
People seem to know of the CMA and to see it as worthwhile. The farming 
community where I grew up, they are fully aware of the CMA and are involved in 
projects with it (VS3). 
 
There is a large and growing respect for the CMA. We used to send out invites for 
the Board dinner and half would turn up. I've just sent out invites, and we are now 
able to get really high-level folks, including Ministers etc. Our community 
surveys show that awareness of the CMA is growing, particularly given the large 
population in the area (VB2). 
 
There was a degree of disaffection with the comparatively poor governance performance 
of some government agencies, reflecting a failure of these agencies to earn legitimacy 
from their regional NRM bodies, and causing embarrassment amongst some government 
NRM staff: 
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I noted the above matters [lack of support, demonstrably incompetent people, 
micro-management, poor internal communication within DSE] to illustrate the 
unsatisfactory governance environment in which the CMAs operate. The need for 
the CMAs to deliver on extensive responsibilities should not be frustrated by the 
very department that should be our primary partner (VB4). 
 
By comparison, DSE's corporate governance is pretty embarrassing. DSE is not 
too good at tracking its own funds or managing its own budgets. I am not sure that 
this is a big problem in itself, but it does create scepticism in CMA land (VG1). 
 
The State Government hasn’t got its own governance right. There is none of what 
you are doing [our good governance principles] or the NRC [Natural Resources 
Commission] standard applying there. DNR has been restructured five times and 
it’s no wonder they are paranoid. They are just not trained in some of this (NS5). 
 
There was also some sensitivity to NSW Government agency glitches and delays that had 
made some regional NRM bodies’ task of earning legitimacy more difficult: 
 
There was a backlog of funding in the NHT1-NHT2 hiatus, which undermined 
community commitment. Also when the new process started, people didn’t 
understand what the CMAs were all about – there was disillusionment with the 
CMAs (NB2). 
 
A video-based computer tool and it’s full of mistakes, glitches and holes. It takes 
so long to go through its processes. It was supposed to be a one-day process. It 
may take three days to collect data and 10 days to run it. DNR developed it, then 
walked away somewhat. It’s so frustrating to use, if it shows a red light – the 
show is over – there is no negotiating – it puts the officers in a bad position. The 
big challenge is that the public has an expectation and they are told that they can 
negotiate but the computer program says ‘no, you can’t negotiate’ and the farmers 
are frustrated (NS4). 
 
Regional NRM bodies generally considered that their processes and responses to ‘conflict 
of interest’ issues are sound, and that probity-related matters were being effectively 
managed through codes of practice, training and procedures. The systems and culture are 
generally in place to support and require the integrity of regional NRM boards and staff, 
and several examples were given of where such procedures are being effectively used to 
prevent inappropriate behaviour: 
 
Conflict of interest: I think processes are pretty good and I haven't seen any 
problems emerge. There have been examples where the board is approving a 
package where some of us have an interest in Landcare groups … But, we raised 
our hand and declared our interests. It is always raised at each meeting … It starts 
really at the board level where there are very well developed and sound 
governance procedures. We have a corporate governance manual and a board 
charter … It took a while to get developed, but now good and filtering down the 
organization, where not only are the elements of good governance known and 
accepted but they are being implemented … Many of the procedures in place, in 
the financial area for instance, we are quiet happy with. There were a couple of 
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attempts to defraud the organization, cheques being cashed overseas, and our 
processes picked this up (VB5). 
 
I think we have enough checks and balances. The only one we have really had to 
deal with was a Landcare one – a charge was brought to us that all the work where 
money was spent went on the president’s and secretary’s properties and the 
treasurer had not seen a financial statement for ages … We therefore asked our 
independent auditors to do an audit which came to our audit committee. While no 
case of fraud was evident it was clear that their practices were deficient and since 
then we have provided basic ‘tennis club’ level governance training (VB4). 
 
At IC [implementation committee] level there are great difficulties. I saw an IC 
member push for works to be done in his area and his son had an ability to 
influence where contracts went and these went somewhere that the father had 
links. We investigated and warned the guy (VB7). 
 
There was the generic public service code but we had the staff write a new code 
of conduct. They actually strengthened it and we now do an annual refresher. 
There is opportunity for staff input to review and modify as needed. Staff 
members sign this code (NS7). 
 
The one area that can be challenging is sponsorship. We have sponsorship from 
[company name]. We had a long discussion on whether we wanted to partner with 
them. We had a long list of criteria for them to conform to before we partnered 
them. We don’t provide the names of project recipients to [company name], that 
is, they don’t have any access to our database. We just hand out the company’s 
brochure. There’s a question of whether we should publish details of our funding 
decisions. We keep a register available that people can ask to see (NS6). 
 
Nonetheless, a few instances of misuse of influence were raised: 
 
There are probably some rogue and personal agendas involved, and we are aware 
of this but I'm not sure we manage that or are in a position to resist that (VS1). 
 
The process (for appointment of board members) was that there were expressions 
of interest for appointment and although these were supposed to be skills-based, 
some weren’t. About 80% are but the process has unravelled a bit since then. I 
worry about it from here on in. For example, a woman retired from the board and 
it took us over a year to replace her because our recommendations sat in the 
Minister’s office – there is a perception that he ultimately appointed a ‘mate’ 
(NB4). 
 
The evidence from our participants suggests that the legitimacy of the regional NRM 
system is generally strong, and strengthening. Systems and personal integrity are in the 
main acceptable, and in some cases exemplary. Earned legitimacy is adequate and 
growing, with several regional NRM bodies making significant efforts in this regard. As 
indicated under inclusiveness below, particular attention needs to be paid to strengthening 
legitimacy with the ‘care’ groups, local governments and with Indigenous communities. 
Concerns remain about insufficient devolution of powers and autonomy by governments 
 12 
to regional NRM bodies. Enhanced trust in and commitment to the system by 
governments is required – a somewhat ironic conclusion, given that the system was a 
creation of these governments in the first place, but one that can be readily explained by 
the propensity of governments to devolve responsibilities for ‘wicked problems’ while 
retaining control over the means by which they can be addressed. An improved level of 
performance by some government NRM agencies is also suggested. 
 
Transparency 
Key words: availability of information, clarity of reasoning, visibility of decision-making 
 
This topic did not receive much attention from participants. Comments generally 
indicated a solid transparency performance. A range of communication media are being 
used, often targeted to particular audiences and needs, and several regions are satisfied 
with their information services: 
 
When we first started there were lots of little newsletters put out around the 
catchment. We started to bring them into a whole of catchment format as well as 
their own local matters. We’ve just appointed a communications officer. 
Information from the community is fed in through the CAGs [Catchment Action 
Groups] who each consist of 10 -12 people and that’s a lot of information and 
then we have our staff directly liaising with farmers. It is a hands-on, on-the-
ground model (NB5). 
 
Given the resources, we do very well – we put out a newsletter quarterly – it is 
tailored to the audience including DPIW [Department of Primary Industries and 
Water], community groups etc. Let’s do quality, let’s be informative, let’s pitch 
multiple messages, we need to ramp it up. Information doesn’t feed down to the 
community well and word of mouth is the biggest method at present (TS3). 
 
Nonetheless, regions that are less mature or relatively resource-poor recognised a need 
for improvement: 
 
The CMA is doing well at getting community feedback – we could do better with 
how we deliver our information to the community (NB2). 
 
Our communications include keeping our website up and getting our newsletter 
out – these are a real struggle. We don’t have a designated officer. I do it one day 
per fortnight (TS4). 
 
Participants offered several examples of where “the board minutes are available publicly” 
(NB6), where regions have “put in place decision-making processes and protocols” 
(VB7), and where reasons for decisions are clearly articulated and promulgated: 
 
The process is documented so that we can justify our decisions to anyone 
including the board, who are sometimes a bit parochial. It is a systematic way of 
looking at it. The board question us regularly – we can walk them through the 
process …With the bush recovery program, we have a matrix which shows why 
money goes to particular individuals rather than others. It is complex but can still 
be traced … We’ve developed our own ranking system based on the 
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environmental services index which is shaped for this area and the process is all 
transparent (NS5). 
 
Use of such processes and tools is not, however, ubiquitous. As with availability of 
information, some regions highlighted aspects of transparency that need improvement: 
 
Transparency: I think it could probably be better. We are putting out an 
information sheet after each Board meeting. We could better articulate the reasons 
for decisions … The challenge for us is to explain what we’re doing and in user-
friendly terms. We put a lot of effort into justification but when our decisions get 
out into the public we don’t condense the explanation of why we’ve chosen 
certain priorities; we don’t explain that our decisions are driven by government 
requirements and the need to plan. Our plan is not in an easily digestible form for 
the average user – it needs to be more accessible (VB6). 
 
I say to staff ‘how will your decision look to the person in the street?’ It is a key 
challenge for the organization … I want to be able to justify our decisions to 
anyone in the context of our values. I hate to hide behind commercial-in-
confidence and freedom-of-information as some do. Your processes should be 
robust enough to withstand any scrutiny (NS7). 
 
Accountability 
Key words: reporting, role clarity 
 
Financial accountability was generally regarded as being very good. Auditing of finances, 
project management and resource allocations appears to be a widespread practice: 
 
Our financial accountability is solid … we’ve had a solid financial system since 
day one … We have accountable contract processes (TS5). 
 
We’re doing well at accountability to the community and commitment to that at 
all levels. We achieve that through allocation of resources and communication of 
decisions. The CMA is well recognised for that in the community. We are very 
conscious of probity in terms of pecuniary interests and in sharing of knowledge 
(VB2). 
 
The accountability in the CMA would be 50 times greater than in the public 
service … The main areas of exposure are in finance – we have processes to 
approve projects, check projects, probity, pecuniary interests, and conflict of 
interest. We’ve had advice from ICAC [Independent Commission Against 
Corruption] on handling government funds, regulating processes for approving 
funds for vegetation management, and a code of conduct that is signed each year 
by staff (this is staff-driven) (NS6). 
 
Accountability of getting a job done is a lot stronger. We have a process where we 
keep a track on that from month-to-month. Accountability through to 
management and then through to the board is now good. This also goes down to 
team leaders and to project officers. Reports are made every month on progress 
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and risks and reasons why we might not be delivering on what we said we would 
(VB3). 
 
We’ve also been audited by Deloittes, who conducted an audit of all our corporate 
governance – it was a risk management study of the whole business – we got a 
good score-card (NB4). 
 
The NSW Government participant agreed that the regional NRM model is providing a 
greater degree of accountability than was evident in the operations of the previous 
Catchment Management Boards (CMBs): 
 
One of the big governance issues from my point of view is the documentation of 
their accountability – [they have been] moved them from quarterly to six-monthly 
reporting – it’s also the acquittals, the closing of projects; it’s finding that they are 
absolutely transparent about their financial position, predictions for cash flows 
and so on. Under the old CMBs it was a bit of a mishmash but the new model is 
more accountable with the CAP [Catchment Action Plan], a three-year rolling 
investment strategy and a one-year budget (NG1). 
 
Several regions made reference to the fact that in some cases effective accountability was 
hard-won, and has taken some time to establish: 
 
Within the organization we did not have clear levels of authority, delegations, or 
systems in place to account for what we do and effectively manage the finances. 
There was a lot of frustration about this and a huge amount of work, so that we 
now know where we are at financially, where our risks are, and how we are 
managing these matters (VB3). 
 
In NSW, the NRC standard was widely seen as a useful tool to provide accountability: 
 
I’m in love with the NRC standard – it’s a way to validate ourselves. We can pull 
out the standard and then put our case. If you’ve documented and adhered to the 
standard, you can easily prove your case (NS4). 
 
However, Victorian regions frequently commented on unnecessarily complex and 
demanding reporting requirements, and to a lesser degree these comments were echoed in 
other jurisdictions: 
 
The amount of reporting is completely over the top given the responsibility given 
to the board, and the level of checks already in hand. The level of micro 
management is hugely inefficient. Red tape reduction is critical to success. We 
need more financial autonomy. We need to make proper use of boards who have 
demonstrated competence in governance (VB1). 
 
I think that as long as you have good corporate governance in place, annual 
reporting should suffice. From a community point of view quarterly reporting and 
the requirement to submit a lengthy final report for Australian Government funds 
received is taxing (VS4). 
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There are still concerns about the extent of reporting to state government. I am not 
saying there shouldn't be comprehensive reporting, just that there is a need to 
avoid duplication … There is a need to get it to the stage where reporting can be 
done more efficiently, and not diverting time from carrying out other elements of 
project management (VB5). 
 
Reporting to government: I'd love to see that modified. New accounting process 
here will do the financials and do the reporting. The Victorian Government will 
accept our new processes and I'm hoping the Feds will as well. I've seen some 
frustrated staff here at times (VB6). 
 
There seems to be a lot of reporting to a lot of bodies – state government, 
Australian Government, annual implementation plan – all the same things to 
different people. There’s a lot of repetition and duplication. The best thing would 
be just one standard report for everyone (NS8). 
 
Role clarity and allocation regarding water, native vegetation and pest plant and animal 
management were raised as concerns, particularly in Victoria: 
 
Native vegetation is a dog’s breakfast in terms of DSE having responsibility – it 
rears its head at local government level, but neither of them have the resources to 
deliver or prosecute enforcement. That is an interesting thing about the Statement 
of Obligations – some things the CMAs have to do, others we do as resources 
permit. What a let out for government! For example, levee banks – what would 
happen if something went wrong? The board decided we needed to stir this 
possum – three years later we are still waiting for clarification (VB4). 
 
There is still confusion about the role of different groups: role of Coastal Board, 
Coast Committees of Management, DSE, CMA. There is multi-agency 
involvement and that causes tension. People are aware of this but are constantly 
trying to do something about and clarify roles (VB5). 
 
At the moment there is a greying about what DSE and CMA does. Certainly we 
have a clear role on river health and works on waterways is the CMAs’. But when 
you get into the broader PPA [pest plant and animals] and those types of things, 
there is a lack of clarity. Without it being clearly articulated from a government 
perspective, then I think the next iteration of the RCS, which we didn't do at all in 
our last RCS, is to have a go and put the challenge out there of who we think is 
responsible for those things (VS5). 
 
Role confusion: with water – wholesale, retail and river health are all different. 
When you have three parts there is a leadership void and any idiot will try to fill 
it. There is overlap. It is the same for land with pest plant and animals. It is not 
clear about who has responsibility and then CMA might not have any money. 
Again with DSE and biodiversity – our job is writing native vegetation plans. 
DSE does the enforcement stuff. We don't have a stream of revenue to do it. The 
only opportunity we have to do it properly is with environmental flows where the 
government charges a 5% levy. Clarity is the important thing. The Statement of 
Obligations issued by the minister to authorities does provide more clarity about 
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the minister's expectations. But they are still vague – what must we do, and what 
can we do. There is actually not much we have to do. Do we do a bit of 
everything? Yes. We need a ‘to do’ list and a ‘not to do’ list (VS2). 
 
There was also support in Victoria for the purchaser-provider relationships that have been 
developed2, whereby a regional NRM body establishes and funds projects that are 
delivered by an external party, which in some cases is a state government agency: 
 
We have certain statutory roles for delivery of service and I think that is being 
handled well. Also then, we are dependent on other bodies for the delivery of 
services, such as DPI [Department of Primary Industries] and DSE and a 
substantial part of our budget involved those groups. I think that is working pretty 
well. There are agreements governing those things (VB5). 
 
I think we have our mix about right here. Most of our earth works are done 
outside. GMW [Goulburn-Murray Water] does project management too. River 
improvement works we do in house. The last thing to do would be to duplicate the 
infrastructure of GMW (VB6). 
 
From the board’s point of view we should not be a delivery or works agency 
ourselves because of the potential for conflict of interest. The difficulty of course 
is that the wider community judge us on on-ground works. The badging of on-
ground works is a sensitivity that we picked up early on (VB4). 
 
The upward accountability of regional NRM bodies is generally at a very high level. 
Some rationalisation of the currently excessive and unnecessary reporting requirements 
demanded by some government agencies would enhance the efficiency and productivity 
of the system without compromising accountability. Downward accountability to regional 
stakeholders received little attention in interviews, although to some extent such matters 
were dealt with in the context of inclusiveness. Greater clarity is needed regarding the 
respective roles and responsibilities of regional NRM bodies, government NRM and 
related agencies, and statutory authorities with some NRM mandate, particularly 
regarding native vegetation, inland waterways, coastal environments, and PPA 
management. 
 
Inclusiveness 
Key words: opportunity, engagement, consideration of values 
 
All regional participants had a high degree of recognition that inclusiveness was a central 
component of establishing a good governance regime. Some regional participants 
considered that the inclusiveness of their decision-making processes is a strength of their 
governance arrangements: 
 
We’ve been good at engaging individuals who weren’t engaged before – there are 
many new names on the incentives program because the CMA is seen as new and 
                                                 
2However, as pointed out to us by a NSW government staff member, some regional stakeholders see 
regional NRM bodies as service providers, so to the extent that they are actually purchasers of outcomes, 
they may not meet community expectations, giving rise to legitimacy and engagement problems. 
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separate from the government and the board is good. This is a really good result 
(NS7). 
 
We have adopted a single goal that is designed so that staff think about the 
community in everything they do. We have said that we will track that through 
our annual customer survey to see if we are getting the whole of the community 
engaged in what we are doing. We have a relatively low level of understanding 
amongst the 350,000 members of our catchment community … but it is growing 
(VB1). 
 
Other regional participants identified inclusiveness as a significant challenge: 
 
We are struggling with how to engage the community and how to engage the right 
sort of partners and the right sort of industries. We probably do not have a good 
record with the corporate world. In some of our documentation we talk about 
customers and I think we should be talking about stakeholders, particularly in 
terms of those that contribute or those who benefit. Some do both. Maybe we 
need a different way of thinking (VS1). 
 
All participating NSW and Victorian regions made reference to some form of community 
advisory committee. These committees are providing a valuable means to widen the 
range of input into decision-making processes beyond the expertise and interests 
represented on regional NRM body boards. There is considerable variation in 
membership, structure and function: 
 
We’ve set up reference groups to engage Landcare, stakeholders, Indigenous 
people, and local government. They sit under Strategy and Planning. There’s a 
sub-unit called Strategic Partnerships (NS4). 
 
The CMA has set up 10 local community advisory groups which provide advice 
on how the incentives are going, strategy and new programs, any needs – they are 
a good way of managing risk and getting feedback. Groups meet four times per 
year with one all together – they are chaired by the local implementation officer 
and a board member is given a liaison role – that gives us good feedback (NB2). 
 
We [have] functioning Implementation Committees [ICs]. We advertise; we have 
a selection panel. Each includes a board member, another IC chair, and eight 
community members. DPI and DSE are also present, but they do not vote. We 
sign off on an annual budget. There is a whole heap of delegations about what 
they can do and what has to go to the board (VS6). 
 
We have the Regional Investment Committee [RIC] … with two board members 
and representatives (convenors) of the operational portfolio groups (Landcare, 
Coastal, Pest Plant and Animal, Waterways, Salinity) and these groups meet on 
their own … Each of these operational portfolio groups meet and then the 
convenor brings views back to the RIC. Each operational group has executive 
support from the CMA. Recruitment varies – probably a range of skills, 
representatives of community groups such as Landcare. Decision-making at board 
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and staff level has been strengthened in terms of having wider and better 
community interest (VB5). 
 
We now have ICs based on irrigation, dryland and grazing, lifestyle. Other CMAs 
have gone down the asset track … The ICs have a charter: no decision-making 
power, but a large degree of influence in advising board. We advertise for 
expressions of interest in membership and find it hard to get people to put up their 
hands. There is a range of selection criteria (VS2). 
 
In Tasmania, such committees are less well developed: 
 
We’re plodding along fairly informally and looking for opportunities for 
engagement. Our IP3 [Investment Plan 3] is where we’ll be looking to do more, 
say through small community reference sub-groups … We need to set up the 
processes to ensure that ideas from the community get to the decision-makers 
(TS2). 
 
In some regions, these committees specifically target key stakeholders that are recognised 
as posing significant engagement challenges: 
 
There are a number of reference groups – a local government reference group and 
an Aboriginal reference group. We have good Aboriginal employees that went out 
to the communities and asked who they wanted to represent them. There’s also 
the Landcare reference group but that has taken some time to get up (NB4). 
 
We’ve been good with partnerships with the Aboriginal community and with 
local government … there was a strong drive from the board and myself. We have 
an Aboriginal reference group that has access to the board – its chair addresses the 
board once a year. To form the reference group we went out and spoke to the 
communities. We asked for one traditional owner and one person affiliated with 
the region ... There’s feedback expected from the reference groups to local 
groups. That’s the model that works really well. Written stuff is an issue – talk is 
the method that works. There has been a real turnaround – they are passionate 
advocates now. We use their traditional knowledge and give ours (NS7). 
 
However, the reference group approach has not always worked: 
 
We haven’t really delivered on our Indigenous programs. We had an Aboriginal 
woman on the board but it didn’t really work out – she didn’t attend all meetings 
and has since moved on … A reference group hasn’t worked – it’s been 
impossible to engage with them because they have a lot of different ideas and so 
we just have to go and talk to individual groups. We’ve put on extra staff 
including an Aboriginal facilitator. We just try to be as inclusive as possible – 
we’ve had several attempts but we haven’t got a good process yet (NB5). 
 
I don't think the ICs are reflective of community views as much as they could be. 
Sometimes the more vocal interests are represented (VS4). 
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Establishing effective engagement with several key stakeholders – Indigenous 
communities, ‘care’ groups, local governments, urban and environmental constituencies 
– was identified by several regions as a significant challenge. With respect to Indigenous 
groups, several regional participants reported progress: 
 
Up to now, I would have said we didn't do too well. But this has changed with 
appointment of an Indigenous person to staff (VB6). 
 
We’ve had to set up processes – 20% of people in land councils have the 
experience so we use these people and they disseminate their knowledge and 
expertise – we’ve given them training in intellectual property, developed a 
template for cultural assessment, and payment schedules with a list of service 
providers. It provides good employment possibilities. This is a much better 
system than the ad hoc process that was in place before … We did it by 
community, family and town groups and with the help of our Aboriginal staff. We 
have two representatives from 23 community groups and that covers three 
language groups – about 30 odd attend each meeting now (NS4). 
 
Relationship with Indigenous communities: improving but still difficult. It took a 
long time to develop productive relationships. Developing an MOU with the three 
Indigenous groups in our area was a positive step. The problem is that the 
relationship between each of the three groups and the CMA individually was 
better than between the three groups together. We are now starting to see some 
concrete proposals coming forward from one of the groups. The fact that we have 
an Indigenous Cultural Heritage position here now is a great step forward. This 
was a specific CMA initiative. It is not working perfectly yet. We are working 
hard to support him (VB5). 
 
Others are uncertain how to proceed: 
 
We have difficulty engaging with the Aboriginal community. The processes 
haven’t worked. Sometimes you try your best but you just can’t do it (NB2). 
 
Aboriginal Advisory Groups were proposed but they haven’t happened. We don’t 
know enough about how Indigenous people would do NRM; we haven’t asked 
them what they would like; we tell them how we think Aborigines should do 
NRM (NS10). 
 
In terms of inclusiveness and fairness and equity, dealings with Indigenous groups 
are quite challenging; it's not for lack of trying … The problem is to determine 
who speaks for whom … There's a naivety of our governance that we didn't 
understand what was needed to make the Indigenous project work well (TG1).  
 
Effective engagement with Landcare is seen by some regions as a major challenge: 
 
The change in funding now through the CMA meant that the groups [Landcare] 
felt that their power and reason for being had been taken away from them and 
decisions made on their behalf (NS9). 
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One of the things that we haven’t done well at is engaging with Landcare. The 
decision by government to cut Landcare coordinators caused great disruption. 
Landcare hasn’t forgiven us though we weren’t responsible for that decision 
(NS7). 
 
There’s an enormous amount of disquiet among the ‘care’ people, who feel 
disenfranchised and as just the providers of free labour (AA1). 
 
Others are more positive about the current state of their engagement, although it is a 
different story with respect to ‘green’ groups: 
 
Our relationship with Landcare is quite different from other areas, in that our 
community capacity budget is restricted to 15% and we contract that out to 14 
capacity builders. One of the criteria for getting contracts is to show a close 
relationship to the community and therefore it’s the Landcare groups that get the 
money. So we have good relationships with Landcare (NS5). 
 
I think the process of setting up Landcare networks is working well. Having 
EnviroFund available to support work by individuals that doesn't have a regional 
priority. We have strong linkages with Landcare groups, but not as much with 
green groups (VB5). 
 
The darker green conservation movement is not engaged with NRM … It's not 
going to sit well with their agenda (TG1). 
 
Engagement with local governments and urban and peri-urban communities remains a 
challenge, though in some regions progress is being made: 
 
Local government – in deference to their important role we try to engage them in 
every thing we do. On that front we have only had limited success. In our region 
local government doesn't see NRM as their primary responsibility (VB1). 
 
Whatever local government does it has impacts on NRM outcomes – local 
government  has a crucial role in engaging the community to make regional NRM 
work – they have to be included. We engage with NRM through the [regional 
councils’ organization] and its general managers and mayors – some are 
committed and rural understanding is more pronounced – so there’s a challenge 
here too (TB1). 
 
We have a large number of non-commercial land holders in this region and a large 
number of peri-urban hobby farmers … there isn’t an organization to represent the 
hobby-farmers (TS1). 
 
There's not a lot of urban engagement although local government engagement is 
offsetting that to some extent (TG1). 
 
We don’t engage with people around [regional centre] – about 60% of our entire 
population. The question is ‘should we?’ ‘How do we do it?’ ‘Is it more important 
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to engage with the land-owner with 12,000 hectares rather than the townsperson 
with a town lot?’ (NB2) 
 
We’ve also moved towards … getting townspeople involved as with urban 
salinity projects and schools. When you consider that of the total population in the 
catchment of 240,000, 160,000 are urban, this is important (NS1). 
 
We have a local government liaison coordinator. Involvement is high. From all 
reports seems to be very good. I don't hear anything negative. We depend on the 
personal skills of our staff to develop effective interactions between the 
organizations. There are partnerships there (VS3). 
 
Some noted the central role that partnerships play in fostering inclusive governance: 
 
One thing that we’re doing well at is partnering – we are getting more resources 
etc. There’s no shortage in being able to partner and network – the sky’s the limit 
in it – it gets more stakeholders (NS3). 
 
Regional NRM bodies display a genuine commitment to inclusive governance, and in 
many cases have made significant advances in engaging with key stakeholders and 
providing opportunities for wide involvement with NRM. For some regions, engaging 
with Indigenous communities, ‘sea’ and ‘tree’ changers, and large agribusinesses remains 
a challenge. No comments were made that directly addressed consideration of values – 
but, of course, value differences were often implicit in references made to different 
stakeholder groups and interests. Nonetheless, intrinsic values (the value of nature for its 
own sake, regardless of human uses and concerns) and future generations were not raised 
as considerations by any participants. In part this reflects the ambivalent relationship 
regional NRM has with the green movement whose members are the traditional voices 
for such values. Several regional participants commented on their lack of influence on 
state and Australian Government NRM decisions. It would also appear that governance 
mechanisms need to be established to more effectively engage regional NRM bodies in 
higher-level decisions that affect them. 
 
Fairness 
Key words: respect, consistency, absence of bias, distribution of costs and benefits 
 
Participants made very few comments about fairness. The only comment made 
concerning respect came from a Victorian regional participant troubled by the attitude of 
Australian Government agency staff towards regions. Consistency in decision-making 
(like circumstances producing like outcomes) was not raised as an issue. Several 
observations were made on the issue of bias in decisions. Concerns were raised about 
political factors as a source of bias or inadequate consideration of distributional issues: 
 
Often allocations depend on the politics of the past rather than good basis for 
decisions (VG1). 
 
More of what I've heard than seen is that there are a lot of squeaky wheels out 
there. This is just the reality of how political processes work. We need to give 
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them the attention they need but make sure they don't get an unfair share of 
resources (VS1). 
 
The prioritisation process, the process from the state and Australian governments 
is for targeted investment and with that, there are winners and losers. In many 
ways the local voice can be lost when you are looking at it from that perspective. 
So, we can have some individuals and groups a bit annoyed that we are not taking 
issues or areas into account properly (VS5). 
 
On the other hand, an instance was cited where a regional NRM body was able to use a 
deliberative process to achieve a fair outcome under difficult circumstances, and another 
observed how the challenge of fairness was being met: 
 
Groundwater reform wouldn’t have happened without the CMA – so the CMA is 
the only competent organization that does deliberative processes well, that is, 
where there is a lose-lose situation, we are able to negotiate a process that seems 
procedurally fair (NB2). 
 
Challenge: I think it would be that you can be seen to be doing the right thing out 
there in the community and that there isn't preferential treatment for some people 
… If anything is questioned it can be referred back to these so we can explain 
how it was approved and why (VS3). 
 
Issues of capacity and perspective were raised as factors underlying the potential for an 
unfair distribution of costs and benefits from NRM decisions: 
 
In coastal areas the plans were already there, rivers councils, acid sulphate soils 
… that meant that in a lot of coastal areas the communities are more savvy, 
decisions were made based on the capacity to take up the money but there’s an 
awareness that other areas are less able in their capacity and so we’ve been 
building their capacity (NB6). 
 
Our strategy was a reflection of our farming community – our brown-green 
strategy – the greens say it’s not fair – that if you pay for the now then you assure 
some kind of future (TB5). 
 
One participant emphasised the importance of transparency in decision-making as a way 
of mitigating the difficulties arising from making trade-offs: 
 
There is not a decision that you make that doesn’t involve trade-offs, which need 
to be acknowledged. It comes into being well-informed and fair … for example, 
the trade-off between the impact on the irrigators and the target of improving the 
wetlands. The thing is for the trade-off to be transparent and that the board has to 
show the transparency through documentation and good research (NS2). 
 
The proposition that a strategic and targeted approach is more appropriate than trying to 
spread effort evenly between and within regions was universally accepted: 
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Fairness and equity are important to us but if it was to be fair then it has failed. 
Even now we are still criticised for spreading the money too thinly. It [fairness] 
can’t be about distribution of the funds; it has to be about the integrity of the 
decision-making processes (AG1). 
 
From the evidence presented, there is a clear awareness that regional NRM bodies must 
implement fair decision-making processes. Systems and procedures generally ensure that 
consistency, absence of bias, distribution of costs and benefits are addressed in decision-
making processes. In some cases, more use of formal procedures would enhance capacity 
and transparency in this regard. Such procedures could also provide a buffer against the 
potential for powerful individuals and interest to exert an undue influence on decisions, 
as could a greater attention to establishing procedures that on the one hand provide for 
effective conflict management, and on the other foster a culture in which mutual respect, 
active listening, honesty, as well as lack of distortion, manipulation and deception 
become the norm. 
 
Integration 
Key words: alignment, vertical and horizontal connection and coordination 
 
Participants generally considered that current governance arrangements for regional 
NRM are encouraging alignment of direction across the national, state and regional 
levels: “pretty much whenever we are undertaking a strategy or action plan it has to tie 
back into the higher level plans” (VS4). There was also one region that is effectively 
aligning NRM priorities with local government plans, although we doubt whether this is 
typical: 
 
We’re also working with them on their local environmental plans, ensuring they 
are compatible with our priorities. Two of our board members are local 
government councillors and several are former local government people (NB2). 
 
While regional participants were generally satisfied with their attention to aligning their 
plans with those generated at higher levels, several criticisms were made of the policy 
sufficiency and coherence at these levels. One participant raised a lack of alignment and 
direction between the governments and regions with respect to water and regional 
development; a Victorian participant hoped that a forthcoming State Government 
statement would overcome a policy deficit with respect to NRM; another alluded to the 
protected nature of the forestry sector in Tasmania in terms of preventing effective policy 
alignment; the policy vacuum in Tasmania and Australian Government disruption of an 
integrated planning approach was lamented; and there were several comments from 
Tasmanian participants concerning a lack of functional connectivity across the system as 
a whole: 
 
I wouldn't be confident when it comes to the management of water and regional 
development – there is little integration of policy. Probably because you need 
some overarching body to look at the overall picture. But there is no-one sitting 
above us (VB6). 
 
Policy coherence: No, we haven't done that … There is a gap when the CMAs 
produce their RCS, which they have done twice already, because there is no 
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overarching coherent strategy. There is a sustainability strategy, but it is not an 
NRM strategy. There are separate strategies, but these are not pulled together in a 
systematic way. This is a governance responsibility of the state (VG1). 
 
Connectedness is an absolute shambles – right down from the Australian 
Government … There is a loose understanding that our core collective business is 
regional resource condition improvement. There is a general sense of priority – 
the government regulates local priorities but the links are loose (TS3). 
 
The Feds came along and said this is a ‘top of the mountain to the sea’ integrated 
plan but the State Government came along and said ‘you can’t talk about forestry’ 
– mining and fisheries are in but not forestry (TB2). 
 
When we packaged up our investment plan, it was consistent with an integrated 
approach and the Commonwealth said ‘no, you can’t do that; we want you to do 
this’ – they forced us to list our projects so the Federal Government could talk 
about these with a degree of ease, perhaps, for the media, perhaps; or politicians 
and advisors could sell projects more readily than an integrated strategy. This 
cherry-picking was the first breakdown in the integrated approach (TB1). 
 
We went into this thinking this was about regional NRM, but too many funding 
sources cut across what we do – Biodiversity Hotspots, Acid Sulphate Soils, we 
have no control over the Envirofund – there’s a lack of integration between 
Commonwealth Government funding programs. This means that our priorities 
can’t be addressed strategically – non-strategic priorities get funded and these 
projects take staff from our core business (TB5). 
 
Such examples suggest a failure on the part of state and Australian Government NRM 
agencies to both develop coherent and integrated NRM policy framework, and to 
implement this in a way that does not undermine advances being made at the regional 
level. Several regional participants alleged a failure on the part of state and Australian 
Governments to attend to the consequences of their policies on regional NRM programs. 
As a result, NRM capability has been compromised and community support and 
confidence eroded: 
 
There are lots of competing interests funded by the same Commonwealth 
departments. Take the Forest Conservation Fund, the Tasmanian Community 
Forestry Fund competes with one of our programs – we worked long and hard to 
get this program and then the political agendas of the governments come in and 
blow it all away … This pervades the whole system of governance – it derails 
everything we do. Trust is so hard to build in this community and it gets eroded. 
You’ve got to apply as well as talk consistency (TS3). 
 
We are the local government area that has a koala management plan and now the 
CMA is the process by which you get approval to clear through the property 
vegetation plan (which says no net loss of vegetation) but the DNR has the 
compliance role and with that approvals for logging of private forest and they 
don’t have to refer to any other plan. They can approve the logging and they’re 
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badly under-resourced. These processes need to be linked, otherwise the CMA is 
wasting time and money (NB6). 
 
As Australian Government NRM staff acknowledge: 
 
The Australian Government needs to place more emphasis on what we want as 
investors not in a hierarchy but collaboratively – we haven’t done this well 
enough (AG2). 
 
Nonetheless, several regions reported effective relationships with their respective state 
NRM agencies and with the Australian Government; between regional NRM bodies and 
Australian Government NRM staff, and between state government NRM staff and 
Australian Government NRM staff: 
 
With DSE there are lots of touch points, dependencies both ways. Overall that 
relationship is healthy (VS1). 
 
Our relationships with the State Government are reasonably good (NB7). 
 
We’ve got excellent relationships with the Australian Government (TS1). 
 
The government has compromised significantly as a result of advice on native veg 
and we are being consulted more directly, eg. the Prime Minister’s Water Plan 
where the State Minister sat down with all CEOs together to discuss. Also our 
discussions with Treasury are now direct rather than through DNR – they want to 
engage us on the bilateral negotiations (NS7). 
 
Our relationship with DPIW is probably the strongest of any region – we’ve made 
it part of the way we do business – a lot of the technical expertise resides there 
and so it’s incumbent on us to do that. It is critical to achieving our ends and we 
initiate it not the state – it has been a struggle and the connectedness has been 
driven by us (TB5). 
 
We have a strong relationship with the Commonwealth. We speak to the 
Australian Government through the NSW Chairs Council that meets once a 
month. The Commonwealth comes to speak with us (NB5). 
 
Connections with the Australian Government – it has taken time to get it to work 
well. There have been constant challenges – these things take time. The team 
based in Canberra is now settled, works hard and does a lot of good things (TG1). 
 
However, frequent reference was also made to inadequate vertical integration between 
regional NRM bodies and state NRM agencies: 
 
We have an RCS that we are supposed to coordinate at the catchment, but there 
are other government agencies doing significant works that impact on the RCS 
that we have no say over, such as DSE and Parks [Victoria] (VS7). 
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Via the DPI case managers, I have tried to keep up the lines of communication, 
and the personal relationship/rapport that I have with many of them. We probably 
don't have as good a relationship with DSE. There is a historic us-and-them 
relationship, particularly with the threatened species group. They would always 
come back to the CMA and say 'we don't need to report through you' [for projects 
funded via the Regional Catchment Investment Plan (RCIP)]. I would show them 
that it was part of the RCIP governance structure that they had to report back 
through us, particularly in relation to biodiversity achievements (VS4). 
 
Access to good NRM data is an issue – the agencies won’t share (NS7). 
 
The allegiance to DNR has changed … CMAs feel accountable to the Joint 
Steering Committee [JSC] rather than the DNR (because that’s who we have the 
contract with). Our relationships with the JSC and NRC are changing because 
we’re forging new direct relationships with Treasury, JSC and so on. DNR don’t 
like this. Treasury and the NRC are eager to deal directly with us (NS1). 
 
However, there are some regions that have developed remedies to such distancing: 
 
We review every six months and we invite the DNR and others to be involved. 
We had a two-day workshop facilitated by the staff with DNR and other 
departments and two community members – received good input. We’ve done 
three of these now – there was very good networking there in the last one (NB3). 
 
Several regions also complained of a lack of support and service delivery by state NRM 
agencies, as well as an alleged competence deficit: 
 
We’re having to really push to build the connectedness to the extent that the 
committee would be reluctant to enter into mutual obligations with the State 
Government because they see the State Government wouldn’t keep up its end of 
the bargain (TS5). 
 
The State Government undertakes very limited development of processes and the 
results don’t necessarily apply to all CMAs ... DNR is not doing the job as well as 
we would like them to (NS9). 
 
The CMAs were set up with DNR as their strategic level, human resource 
management, finance and information technology providers, but since then DNR 
has down-sized their services and it can’t provide what it contracted to do (NS1). 
 
Connections are generally pretty good but the critical issue is the lack of 
agreement with DNR about the provision of corporate services. Currently they are 
providing them for free – the Minister wanted this … he didn’t want decentralized 
provision or bureaucracies developing. But we don’t have a signed agreement 
about the details – so we have ongoing conflict about deliverables, about 
information technology (that’s one of the biggest) and finances … There’s a need 
to get a service level agreement … It’s getting better but not what it should be … 
In other words, systems governance is an issue ...We’re now developing our own 
system. DNR promised to do this in the beginning but it hasn’t happened yet. We 
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resisted initially but are now being forced into investing resources into a database 
solution (NS7). 
 
I don't think the Feds could run a bath full of water. No one there knows anything. 
How could they implement the Howard water plan? They are just too remote to be 
any use. So, there is a fair bit of tension in those relationships (VS6). 
 
Horizontal integration between regional NRM bodies and local government planning is 
on the agenda for some regions, although little substantive progress has been made, and 
other regions see the current separation as appropriate: 
 
Going back about a year there was a workshop held with all the senior members 
of local government in our catchment to start at ground zero to look at how we 
should work together … The board's vision is that the CMA wants to control the 
planning process: take a role from a statutory point of view for all planning 
decisions, rather than just the waterways as at the moment. Exactly how it looks 
and works, that is the work we have to do. At least we would want a referral 
power to consider every development from a view of potential impact on CMA 
areas of responsibility. Our discussion last year suggests that local governments 
were receptive. Feedback so far is that they are keen to talk about it (VS1). 
 
Local government is an issue we want to tackle in a major way. We made some 
progress on that last year. At our recent corporate planning workshop we said we 
want two significant projects running with local government. We have 14 
municipalities. Local government has planning powers the CMAs don’t have but 
they don’t have the resources to do what they are supposed to in NRM. I would 
like to see local government MSSs [Municipal Strategic Statements] and the RCS 
more complementary and supportive. Whether CMA will be allowed to evolve to 
another level is to be seen (VB4). 
 
I don't see transferring power – that would not be politically feasible. I don't like 
the idea of centralising many powers as then power becomes too remote from the 
people. A regional scale is not appropriate in this regard. For example, with 
piggery proposals, there are lots of objectors and you need to have lots of 
meetings and be prepared to help people learn about the issues. A catchment-scale 
is far too big for these types of planning issues. I guess you could do floodplain 
planning inside councils if you had the resources and expertise (VB7). 
 
At several levels, the observation was made that where effective integration is occurring, 
it is reliant on relationships between particular individuals, which are constantly being 
threatened by relatively high levels of staff turn-over, particularly in the Australian NRM 
agencies: 
 
In the term of the previous Board we had representatives of DPI and DSE on our 
Board, but those have been abolished. We are still trying to work out how to 
establish relationships other than with person-to-person (VB5). 
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Consistency with the Australian Government is hard because people change; it’s 
better with the State Government. It’s a problem that it’s dependent on particular 
people (TS4). 
 
Horizontal integration between CMAs is patchy, but strengthening as a result of recently 
established programs of meetings between board chairs and between general managers: 
 
As deputy chair, I get feedback from CMA chairs council meetings – backed up 
by figures on outputs. All the chairs get together every two months as do the 
general managers – there is a lot of collegiate co-operation – some projects are 
jointly run (NB4). 
 
Links between CMAs are reasonably effective, but I'm sure they can be improved. 
Some of it is formalised through chairs’ and CEOs’ committees, communication 
officers and finance officers. Some is through personal relationships of staff … I 
think our relationships with some neighbouring CMAs are more important than 
with those that are more distant (VB5). 
 
For a period around 1998/99 there was a sense of competition between the CMAs 
and they went into their shell, but they have come out of it now, though there are 
some remnants of that. They are now using the same project management 
software – which is an advance given that they were all using quite different ones 
five years ago. Each CMA has developed its own human resources management 
system, but they are discussing these things now (VG1). 
 
However, cross-jurisdictional integration at the regional level remains limited, and there 
are participants from all three states of the view that competition between regions 
remains a significant barrier to effective collaboration and coordination between regional 
NRM bodies: 
 
There was a particular individual in [Australian Government NRM agency] who 
was very much in favour of competition. The result is that there is very little 
collaboration between the regions because there’s bad blood because of that 
competition – [NRM region] got shafted, [NRM region] did well, and [NRM 
region] got some of what they wanted. This sort of thing wouldn’t happen with 
the mainland CMAs, probably because they are really strong and really well-
established and wouldn’t put up with this sort of thing (TB2). 
 
There is little evidence that we have moved much beyond competition (VB4). 
 
We need to do better with our CMA collaboration. We’re still a bit competitive 
and we should be more cooperative and support the weakest. Our biggest threat is 
a political one and that’s the failure of one CMA. That’s why we need to support 
each other more. We should delineate the area of competition and agree on the 
areas where we need to support each other (NS2). 
 
Participants offered numerous examples of effective partnerships and projects between 
regional NRM bodies and other regional NRM providers, including local government: 
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We’ve got good partnerships with service providers and with the other regions. 
I’m happy with the technical and facilitator network – it is of untold benefit (TS1). 
 
We use DPI and DSE and GMW as partners for delivery. You don't compete with 
your partners. We could have set up our own unit, but we chose to stick with them 
and it has worked out. With DPI, despite some staff turnover, we decided to stick 
with them. We have an MOU that specifies how we behave in public and in 
private, and we have a Partnership Management Team … At least you are saying 
we are in this together (VS6) … We have formal monthly meetings as well as 
informal linkages, for example, with GMW, farming groups, environment groups 
(VB6). 
 
We have stronger ties with local government and joint projects up to several 
million dollars (NB4). 
 
We’ve got really good strategic work happening at the subregional level. This has 
been good for building partnerships. An example is with the [two local 
governments] and their … project for improving connectivity between vegetation. 
Another good example is the [strategy] which includes community engagement, 
threatened species and weed management, and Ramsar protection (TS1). 
 
We found $1 million that was uncommitted and we took this to the local 
government reference group looking for a project that furthered our CAP targets. 
They came up with a catchment wide salinity push – 13 councils working together 
with the large ones … supporting the smaller ones with technical resources. This 
partnership enhances the salinity alliance through getting on-ground activity. They 
originally wanted three geographically based reference groups. We said ‘no’. 
They now acknowledge that was the right decision and it has turned out well. 
What’s happened is that the councils are working together and taking a 
catchment-wide perspective, which hadn’t happened before (NS7). 
 
Integration of NRM policy and action across national, state and regional levels is patchy. 
A broad level of coherence is evident in the direction set in national, state and regional 
policy planning statements. Communication, if not coordination, between some regions, 
their respective state NRM agencies, and Australian Government NRM staff, is well 
developed and apparently constructive. As the regional model matures, coordination 
between regional NRM bodies, and with other regional NRM providers, is strengthening. 
The observation that a regional NRM body is catalysing efforts amongst local 
governments to better coordinate their efforts suggests a widening of institutional 
regionalisation – a trend that has the potential to yield significant dividends in terms of 
integrating policy development and service delivery at the regional level, with the 
likelihood of associated efficiency and productivity gains. 
 
However, system-wide deficiencies remain in both vertical and horizontal connection and 
coordination. An NRM policy vacuum is evident in some states, which is hampering the 
development of a strong unified direction for NRM initiatives at this level. The 
haphazard performance of some state agencies in terms of service delivery, and their 
apparent lack of awareness or consideration of how their actions affect specific regional 
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NRM programs, undermine the credibility of the regional model amongst some local 
communities and hamper the effectiveness of regional action. 
 
Capability 
Key words: business systems, funding, human resources, knowledge 
 
Business systems for regional NRM bodies encompass procedures for managing 
governance, finances, contracts, records, information, staff and projects. The importance 
of getting these systems in place and effective was emphasised by several participants. 
For example: 
 
We stumped up $50k to put thinking in process. So, from day one we had worked 
through a lot of the process stuff such as delegations, and we got right the 
transition from the former authority … It was the best $50k we ever spent. From 
then on, it was about getting the strategies right and implementation processes 
right (VS6). 
 
We have a very strong board, solid policies and procedures. The previous board’s 
primary responsibility was to set up good governance processes. They have done 
that. For example, every project has a project plan. There are contract compliance 
processes in place, as well as defendable procurement policies (VS2). 
 
The relative maturity of regional NRM bodies influences the degree to which they have 
such systems in place. Victoria, and to a lesser extent NSW, generally have strong 
business systems, although there are exceptions: 
 
The corporate governance side of things has been an important element in last 
three years. Prior to the last three years that was not strong. The board and chief 
executive officer have driven that change and articulated roles. I wouldn't 
underestimate the strong leadership of the board and this has flowed right through 
the organization. Numerous audits brought up certain significant issues about how 
we managed things. There were fairly significant risks that the board identified – 
contractual issues, issues around the Board getting involved in project 
management (VB3). 
 
While rapid progress has been made in Tasmania, some basic developmental work 
remains: 
 
Our challenges are financial – we have heaps of argument about finance – we 
don’t know how much money we have – we have so many buckets – that’s to do 
with our teething problems – we don’t have enough money to employ a book-
keeper or an accountant (TB2). 
 
Concerns were raised by participants in some regions about the effects state government 
imposed procedures and constraints have on their ability to develop and implement good 
business systems: 
 
The pressure from Treasury is compromising our business processes because it’s 
forcing us to give money up front and we don’t have any come back. We say to 
 31 
treasury ‘you are forcing us to compromise our accountability’ – that is, we can’t 
ensure the funds are spent how they should be spent (NB8). 
 
We don’t have our own financial autonomy on human resources or information 
technology ... There is duplication here – it was supposed to streamline processes 
but it doesn’t (NB5). 
 
DNR don’t seem to think CMAs are responsible organizations – they don’t trust 
the CMA’s ability – they see the CMA as untrained children running around; they 
don’t think the CMAs are competent in many areas. For example, DNR has 36 
checking procedures for payment of money so it takes five weeks to issue a 
cheque – they won’t let CMAs act autonomously (NB2). 
 
Many of the groups that have been carrying out NRM type work in our region 
over the past 10 years are not able to meet the new business requirements – for 
example, public liability insurance and so on. The issue for us is that Canberra has 
ideas about the way they would like to see NRM delivered and often these models 
are based on successful models from areas with large populations, greater 
community capacity and skills and organizations with greater work capacity. 
Many of these models need tweaking to fit our situation or it takes time to build 
the skills in the region to be able to implement them (TS2). 
 
Not surprisingly, a lack of financial resources was raised by all regions as a significant 
capability constraint. Several regions are actively diversifying their income bases with a 
view to establishing a more sustainable financial position: 
 
We’ve started up a trust – we’ve gone through the process of getting it 
legitimised. We’re going to corporations for contributions to improve NRM – the 
Natural Resource Environmental Trust (it’s separate from the NSW Government 
Environmental Trust). The board members and the general manager constitute the 
trustees; the trust has charity status and now we’re going out to investors and 
philanthropists. They are rural resource enterprises, banks and building societies, 
fuel companies and so on. Qantas Link is interested with carbon credits (NB6). 
 
In Victoria, where CMAs previously had the authority to raise funds from their regional 
constituents by imposing tariffs, re-instituting such powers was seen by some participants 
as part of a long-term strategy to meet their financial needs: 
 
I don't think the CMAs can function to their full potential unless they have the 
potential to raise their own funds. This would give them a sense of control, and 
allow them to leverage those funds for other funds. In Victoria we have an 
environmental levy on our water rates and this was intended to provide funds for 
catchment improvement, but the focus has been on infrastructure and the 
government holds the money – the CMAs are invited to suggest projects but these 
are not managed by the CMAs (VG1). 
 
Uncertainty of the extent, timing and conditions attached to government funding has 
made it difficult for regional NRM bodies to build the long-term partnerships and 
programs that are essential for effective NRM outcomes. Trust by governments in 
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regional NRM bodies was identified as a key requirement for the establishment of more 
durable and flexible funding arrangements. It was acknowledged that to earn this trust, 
regional NRM bodies must have strongly developed business systems and well-
credentialed boards. Most regions consider that they have both these elements in place, 
and that it is time for governments to give them the financial autonomy they need. 
Proposals to move to a block funding model were strongly supported, as this would give 
regions more flexibility to move funds around. The current drought, for example, 
provides a compelling reason for increasing regions’ financial autonomy and funding 
certainty: 
 
I wonder why, sitting out here in a drought-ridden region, and Canberra is saying 
that the money is being spent but it’s not realistic to expect that we should be 
getting the money out because the landholders don’t have the ability to do it now. 
How could it be better done so that we can spend well when there is drought and 
spend differently in good times … the funding is too inflexible. The drought 
would have been a wonderful time to empower communities and get the capacity-
building done – we could have linked in with the Healthy Communities/Healthy 
Minds program. It’s a brilliant time to do erosion control works before the floods 
come (NS3). 
 
We’ve developed this army of willing people but it needs additional funding and 
this is where the system breaks down. You build up steam and then the brakes are 
put on and you lose a few people and then everything revs up and the funding 
authorities expect things to get up and running straightaway but it takes time to re-
rev the community (NB6). 
 
We’ve had a media release saying the funding will be ongoing but we don’t have 
any knowledge of what our funding will be post June ’08 – we can’t give surety to 
our providers, contractors and so on – we need something written or signed on the 
dotted line by July 1 2008 just to pay our staff bill which is $30,000 per fortnight 
(TS1). 
 
There are indications that the Australian Government is responding to such concerns: 
 
We’ve taken on board criticisms and changed our processes. For example, we’ve 
been able to put in a variations protocol to enable variations to projects. We’re 
putting more trust in the regions. Ministers want to be a bit conservative. We’re 
telling the Minister that the regions have matured (AG2). 
 
The impact of funding on the ability of regions to recruit and retain high-calibre staff was 
also noted, as was the low level of remuneration for chairs and board members: 
 
Because we’re on three-year rolling funding, we can’t contract excellent people 
for five years, we can’t say to our providers that they should build staff – and in 
regional areas human capital is our most important asset – it’s hard to keep people 
in the regions under this funding regime (TB2). 
 
Young staff with mortgages and kids need more certainty in their lives and longer 
term contracts (TS1). 
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What is asked of chairs in our regions is far more than we are being rewarded for 
– if it’s an honorarium and you believe the role is worth doing and you’re 
achieving results then you’d be happy to do it for nothing – but if it’s considered 
‘pay’ (with the levels of frustration we have to put up with) then it’s a bloody 
insult (VB4). 
 
Despite these factors, the general calibre of boards and staff appears high to very high, 
and where a particular skill is needed and resources limiting, some regions are adopting a 
partnership approach: 
 
We have a well-rounded board with lots of experience and able to know when 
they need to get other advice. We have some technical skills, landholder skills, 
political skills (VS2). 
 
Amongst our staff we have identified the expertise we need: for example, 
managing environmental flows. We identified the best person, but we couldn't 
afford to employ him so we partnered a neighbouring CMA and got him (VB8). 
 
There was general support for skills-based rather than elected boards. However, in the 
medium to long term, the willingness of high-calibre board members to maintain their 
largely voluntary commitment may weaken. Recruitment and staff turnover remain an 
issue, especially for smaller, resource-poor or more remote regions, and the rapid turn-
over and capabilities of government NRM staff were also raised as significant concerns 
by some regional participants: 
 
Compare [one region] with [another region] which has a similar background and 
issues and context – they have 42 staff and we have six – there’s a critical matter 
of staffing, a threshold at which you can make it work – a critical mass. There was 
no one there to deal with the processes or to look at the risks – this was my job. 
We’ve been really lucky with the people but it’s a risk if we don’t have particular 
skills … I’m so thin across a lot of things – I can identify a risk but I don’t have 
enough time to deal with it (TS3). 
 
The Tasmanian committees have inherent difficulties getting the level of skill and 
commitment that would be ideal – it's hard to find people. A lot depends on the 
character and ability of the chair and the executive officer (TG1). 
 
The staff are doing project management training – they are not skilled in this and 
few have financial management skills. The CMA is a stepping stone for young 
staff. We have a high turnover – it is project based work and we accept that. The 
board feels it has a responsibility and we feel that we have to train them even 
though we’ll probably lose them to somewhere else (NB3). 
 
If you get the staff churn factor happening, you don’t get time to build up 
relationships, you don’t get to the stage where you can make good decisions, you 
have to explain what is going on. Then you get people who have been around a 
while, know the history of programs – that makes it easier (VS7). 
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Some regions are developing effective strategies to address such issues: 
 
Succession planning is now being addressed so that we don’t have to do a huge 
recruiting drive every time we need to fill a position. It’s best to grow our own … 
We offer a package with extra leave, the attractions of rainwater, a car – it’s a new 
package that has increased our applicant rate from four or five to 45 (TS3). 
 
Effective and integrated knowledge management and communication systems are 
recognised as being fundamental to regional NRM’s capacity to deliver the required 
outcomes. State NRM agencies were identified as the key governance layer that could 
develop and coordinate the delivery of such products: “I see the state agencies as 
generally the manager of key technical data bases, who then make sure the CMAs have 
access to those and to develop methodologies for the CMA to use” (VG1). However, 
participants were not aware of any significant state initiatives to address the knowledge 
deficit, and regional NRM bodies are struggling to do it on their own: 
 
There’s a really big problem with knowledge transfer because all the good data is 
on a state database and the national audit is just no good. The audit has just taken 
bits of state data. Data management is really important for the targets because you 
have to be able to measure so that you can see what’s happened. There are lots of 
people in lots of corners doing lots of different things and none is integrated. 
Intersection with the scientific community is variable; some boards are good, 
others are quite hostile (AA1). 
 
Learning and knowledge exchange – there is limited capacity within the CMA 
movement generally. It is recognised by strategy leaders as a really important part 
of what we do and you cannot change behaviour unless we have knowledge. But 
our capacity (this CMA and across the State) is still inadequate (VB1). 
 
Effectiveness is dependent on more and a better organised data system – we are 
keen to have better data management with respect to the biophysical information 
and a more integrated one. We had employed some one to develop a data 
management system but we haven’t made much headway there (NB7). 
 
We were the first CMA to be linked to the CMAs’ website. We are trying to do 
more by establishing a web-based support system. There is more we can do. We 
are making a requirement that our projects are linked to the CMAs’ site. It is still 
a matter of how you distribute knowledge … We can do better (VB2). 
 
In the main, regional NRM bodies have well-established business systems, and those that 
do have deficiencies are making it a priority to remedy the shortcomings. The level of 
funding, and more particularly the manner of its delivery and the associated constraints 
imposed on regional NRM bodies, are significant impediments to the capability of 
regional NRM. Some regions are well-placed in terms of their access to the necessary 
skills and expertise, but remote and chronically under-resourced regions are suffering 
disadvantage in this regard. Turnover of staff at all levels within the system was 
recognised as a capacity constraint. Knowledge management systems, an essential 
ingredient of NRM capability, are of limited effectiveness and in some cases poorly 
developed. 
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Adaptability 
Key words: learning, monitoring-evaluation-review, threats-opportunities-risks 
 
The importance of establishing regional NRM bodies as learning organizations was 
widely recognised by participants, particularly in Victoria, and several examples of good 
practice were offered, as well as calls for improvements to be made: 
 
The project review committee do a review at the end of each project. The 
expectation would be that if there is a barrier or risk, that by documenting it that it 
becomes a lesson for others. Obviously that would be something we want to share 
across the organization. The idea of the project support group is not just to look at 
projects that are struggling, what about the projects that are running ahead, 
because that can have some risks. If you see projects that are led by people who 
have projects that are always finished on time, you can learn some lessons. 
Perhaps that person does better at community engagement. You can then build 
that lesson into your projects as best-practice (VS5). 
 
We review the board performance annually and indeed, the board committees are 
reviewed. And we review the performance of the chairman. That has been a very 
useful process in terms of the lessons learned. It is not about criticising; it is about 
how we can improve our performance on the basis of the past twelve months 
(VB5). 
 
At the operational level we are able to learn – for example, with willow 
management. Questions raised by some landholders have caused us to review 
what we do and we are overturning the traditional approach and looking at a 
better way to do it. This was a good sign that the experienced staff were prepared 
to say we can do better (VB5). 
 
We are doing as well as anyone. Given the resources, time, complexity of 
systems, culture (getting people to think about why they are doing things). We 
have a section in our reporting called ‘snapshots’ where we ask for key learnings. 
It comes back to testing your assumptions, especially your critical ones (VS7). 
 
We’ve … adapted our decision-making structure over time; we are a learning 
organization (TS1) 
 
As we develop, we need to have staff dedicated to improve their own knowledge, 
get learnings from the projects that have been implemented and think about 
setting up processes so that learning can be achieved as an integral part of project 
management and implementation. We don't do a lot of that. We haven't set up the 
processes to do that in any specific way (VB1). 
 
Some participants showed awareness of the importance of basing monitoring, evaluation 
and review (MER) systems on outcomes rather than outputs. Such systems go beyond 
merely providing accountability – they give an organization the capacity to adapt 
direction and/or means of implementation using evidence and lessons learned from 
experience. MER processes are well established in a few regional NRM bodies, but are 
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still under development in most others, and at the state level significant deficiencies were 
identified: 
 
We audit project management, tracking right through using the [regional] project 
management framework. MER and risk management are seen as our key process 
tools. We take MER very seriously and put a lot of effort into getting it right. Our 
prime responsibility is to develop and implement the RCS, and MER is critical 
(VS7). 
 
We have one of the best practitioners in the field. But we have not really thought 
how we build MER up front into projects and no-one is held accountable for this. 
It is not a matter of rapping people over the knuckles but highlighting to us that 
there is a problem and we need to respond (VS1). 
 
Another big challenge for me is to develop a MER system. It’s hard to measure 
outcomes – the only way is to work within the State Government MER program 
but capture local changes. We’ll try to demonstrate in 10 MER sites that certain 
actions lead to specific changes and try to extrapolate this to the whole catchment 
(NS4). 
 
We have decided we will not produce another strategy unless it includes ways of 
measuring success. We are not there yet, but have a statement of intent (VB1). 
 
We’re implementing a monitoring system but that system is slow to get going. It’s 
hard to know how effective we’re being – we’re measuring kilometres of fencing, 
area of vegetation protected, etc but in terms of overall effectiveness we didn’t 
know what was there in the first place. The data sets are incomplete (NB7). 
 
It stuns me that we have now had these systems up for 10 years and we cannot say 
how successful they are. A lot of work has gone into it, and we have done OK in 
water areas, but not in the land area. So there are question marks over how 
effective the investments have been. Without that the whole approach is 
vulnerable in a marketing sense. What we don't have in Victoria is a body that is 
clearly responsible for MER at the state government level. We have the 
Commissioner for Environmental Sustainability who could have done this, but it 
is not part of his mandate. There is a governance issue there (VG1). 
 
As well as having a learning culture and effective MER systems, an adaptable 
organization identifies threats, manages the associated risks, turns risks and threats into 
opportunities, and is able to identify and respond to new opportunities as they arise. 
Though significant progress has been made by some regions, particularly in Victoria with 
respect to risk management, building such adaptive capacity is still a work in progress for 
many regional NRM bodies: 
 
There is no limit on people’s creativity but they don’t do documentation of 
processes well. This means that there is little risk analysis. The processes are 
understood well by individuals but there’s no documentation. There’s no 
documentation for risk analysis processes although the minutes of the 
management team meeting would reflect the decision-making processes (NS1). 
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The business planning committee checks that things are happening. So far it has 
been up to the board to pick up changes in the external environment. We would 
probably do better if we had staff resources allocated to scanning for changes that 
might impact on the CMA – the new national water plan, climate change, block 
funding, stewardship payments for NHT 3 (VB1). 
 
We need to get better at assessing any risks in delivering projects; identify the risk 
and possible ways to address it. We now have a team to do this (VS3). 
 
Responsiveness is obvious but it’s weak for us though; adaptive management is 
needed for the next investment plan (TS5). 
 
One respondent lamented the reactive nature of their adaptive responses: “We epitomize 
adaptive management – we are too responsive and we need to be more proactive and 
manage for risks” (TS3). What is being described here is the passive approach to adaptive 
management – the literature also recognises an active adaptivity that initiates directed and 
experimental interventions and can incorporate a risk management capability (Allan & 
Curtis 2005). Active adaptive management, the more mature and developed approach, is 
not a well developed practice in any of our partner regions. 
 
Several regional NRM bodies are effectively establishing themselves as learning 
organizations, while others are just beginning down this road. Participants gave no 
evidence to indicate whether state or Australian Government NRM agencies were 
similarly focussed. There is widespread recognition that effective MER processes are an 
essential part of good governance, but few regions have fully operational systems. State 
and national level processes are also under-developed. A similar situation pertains to the 
identification and treatment of threats, risks and opportunities. 
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4.  VIEWS FROM THE LITERATURE 
 
In this section we summarise the findings from a number of papers concerned with 
regional NRM in Australia. Some of the papers are at least in part based on an analysis of 
empirical data from case study regions or the system as a whole, while many draw 
conclusions based on understandings of the wider processes that shape and influence the 
system. Most are by academics, but three are consultants’ reviews commissioned by 
government. The purpose is not to present in detail or analyse the credibility of the 
arguments as presented in these documents. Rather, we summarise the claims made 
regarding strengths and weaknesses of regional NRM, so that in Section 5 we can 
examine the extent to which they are supported or refuted by the empirical data presented 
in Section 3. To aid such comparability, we have confined our review to papers published 
after the establishment of the regional framework (that is, papers published no earlier 
than 2002), as well as to works that specifically deal with some aspect of Australian 
NRM governance. 
 
The concerns are grouped under the following themes related to our principles: 
legitimacy and accountability; inclusiveness; integration; capability; and adaptability. 
Matters directly related to transparency and fairness were not significant points of 
discussion in the literature reviewed, although fairness was considered in the context of 
engagement by, for example, Lane et al. (2004a) and Moore (2005) who pointed to the 
exclusion of some stakeholders from the benefits flowing from targeted investments. 
 
Legitimacy and accountability 
 
Issues of legitimacy raised in the literature focus on devolution of power and democratic 
representation. Lane et al. (2004a) and Marshall (2007), amongst others, argue that 
devolution should occur such that tasks can be undertaken at the least centralised level of 
governance that has the (potential) capacity to satisfactorily complete them, as well as 
represent all actors with an interest at this level. This is the principle of subsidiarity. They 
go on to argue that this principle has not been followed in the detailed design of regional 
NRM in Australia. 
 
[G]overnment has decentralized progressively greater powers to so-called 
community-based systems of environmental governance. Nevertheless, key 
decisions regarding the course of this development remain centralized, rather than 
assigned consistently with an unbiased reading of the principle of subsidiarity. 
The so-called partnerships between governmental and community-based levels 
emerging from this decentralization remain largely characterised by the 
hierarchical purchaser-provider relationships of New Public Management, and 
much less by the vision of collaborative-partnerships-between-equals that 
originally mobilised local communities to ‘sign up’ to a government-sponsored 
model of community-based conservation (Marshall 2007, p. 14). 
 
As explained in Report 3 of our Pathways project, devolution is part of neo-liberalism’s 
‘roll out’ phase of new institution building. Initiatives associated with this agenda include 
reducing the size of government; increasing individual self-reliance; as well as the new 
public management approach to government that, amongst other things, involves 
outsourcing and an emphasis on incentive structures (Stratford et al. 2007). In this 
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context, governments have responded to pressures for assistance and action on ‘wicked 
problems’ (Davidson et al. 2006) such as natural resource management by distributing 
funding and responsibilities to regional bodies without devolving the necessary degree of 
power and autonomy they need to be successful (Head 2004, Paton et al. 2004, Beer et al. 
2005). Governments remain reluctant to relax their control over program design and key 
elements of the decision-making process (Head & Ryan 2004a, 2004b, Marshall 2007). 
 
As Moore & Rockloff (2006) note, the process adopted for regional NRM is one of de-
concentration where, although some power is transferred to lower-level actors, regional 
NRM bodies remain accountable to government and not to their own constituencies (a 
matter we come back to in relation to accountability). As well as the wider political 
milieu in which they are operating and which they help produce, this reluctance of 
governments to more fully devolve powers and autonomy to regional bodies is also 
explained, somewhat ironically, by a lack of trust in the good governance credentials of 
the very regional NRM bodies they have in large part created (Keogh et al. 2006). Head 
(2005) asserts that building trust in the new NRM processes will be difficult as long as 
governments disguise the use of institutionalised power in the rhetoric of partnerships. 
Consequently, there are calls for regional bodies to be conferred with greater autonomy 
and flexibility than is evident in the current structures that provide for only partial and 
conditional devolution (Beer et al. 2005, ITS Global 2006, Marshall 2007). Griffith et al. 
(2007), Vogel & Zammit (2004) and Walter Turnbull (2005) have explored and tested 
quality assurance models, which are claimed would improve investor and community 
confidence in regional NRM bodies and lead to greater devolution. 
 
At the same time, passing substantial responsibility for NRM to regional governance 
authorities risks the marginalisation of distant stakeholders’ interests (Lane 2006), and 
fails to recognise the significance of state-directed governance for redistributive roles and 
public good provision (Lane et al. 2004a). Lane (2006) and Moore & Rockloff (2006) 
recognise that governments have a legitimate responsibility with regard to broad-scale 
issues such as nature conservation and representing the interests of non-regional 
constituencies, as well as providing fora for engagement of environment groups and 
others who urge that the interests of wild nature and future generations be taken into 
account, to which we would add acting on international concerns and obligations. 
 
Also at issue is the legitimacy of regional boundary definitions (Lane et al. 2004a). Reeve 
& Brunckhorst (2007) show that NSW NRM regions do not reflect the scale of 
environmental externalities, are not biophysically homogenous, do not have boundaries 
that pass through areas of minimum community interest, and that they perform poorly 
against a Community Capture Index that measures the extent to which boundaries divide 
areas with which people identify and in which they have an interest. Morrison & Lane 
(2006) point out that it is problematic to define a ‘region’ on the basis of either a 
community of common interest, an economic unit, a biophysical unit or a combination of 
these, and that indeed many rural issues are extra-regional. Lane (2006) argues that 
instead of single-scale governance, a multi-level nesting of institutional responsibilities 
and capabilities is required, with some focussing on a particular scale (such as regional 
NRM bodies) and some working across scales (such as governments). Lane et al. (2004b) 
also point out that some environmental problems demand action at supra-regional scales 
and many are cross-scalar, leading to a mismatch between the scales at which the issues 
manifest and the structures in place to address them. And while “the co-governance 
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aspirations of regional stakeholders may not be easily realised under these conditions of 
institutionalised power” (Head & Ryan 2004b, p. 20), Marshall (2007) argues that some 
regions are too big and complex, and fail to meet the subsidiarity goal of devolving to the 
level closest to those stakeholders most affected, as well as stretching the capacities of 
regional NRM bodies beyond what might be reasonably expected. 
 
While Robins & Dovers (2007), amongst others, recognise the very considerable 
commitment of regional stakeholders as a strong point of regional NRM, some authors 
question the genuineness of some governments’ commitment to NRM: 
 
a serious but unrecognised blurring of motives and objectives can occur on the 
part of the States. For State leaders political objectives (e.g. success in securing 
federal funds to supplement State funds) are likely to be just as important as 
intrinsic policy objectives (e.g. commitment to the stated goals of a national 
strategy and associated grants program) (Head 2004, p. 20). 
 
There may be an implicit desire by national and state/territory political actors to displace 
some of the political responsibility for difficult priority setting and tradeoffs onto the 
regional level (Head & Ryan 2004b, Head 2005). There is also the potential for political 
discomfort to be avoided by allocating the central delivery role to a tier of governance 
that has no capacity to enforce standards or raise the bar above levels acceptable to 
industry stakeholders (Head & Ryan 2004b). Marshall (2007) questions whether genuine 
collaborative partnerships exist between governments and regional actors, suggesting that 
the rhetoric of partnerships masks a governance system that aligns government interests 
with those of lower level agents, with no real sharing of decision-making power3. 
 
While earned legitimacy as such has been raised directly in the literature, with Head & 
Ryan (2004a) and Head (2005), for example, questioning stakeholders’ acceptance of 
regional NRM bodies, more extensive commentary has been made on the connection 
between accountability and legitimacy. Whether stakeholders see regional NRM bodies 
as having the legitimacy to act, Lane (2006) argues, depends on mechanisms to ensure 
‘downward’ accountability. Downward accountability would require regional decision 
makers to justify their actions to regional stakeholders. Lane et al. (2004a) contend that if 
regional bodies are not downwardly accountable to locals, as well as upwardly to 
governments, then decentralisation will not yield more effective and democratic natural 
resource management. In the absence of clear downward accountability, the emphasis on 
demonstrating compliance with stringent upward accountability measures makes it hard 
for regional bodies to be perceived as community-based (Marshall 2007). In contrast to 
upward accountability, mechanisms for accounting sideways to partners and downward to 
stakeholders are poorly developed (Moore & Rockloff 2006). In responding to top-down 
government directives, some boards have become less responsive to their regional 
constituency (Robins & Dovers 2007). Electing representatives is one way of formalizing 
downward accountability arrangements – without such formalisation, Moore & Rockloff 
(2006) argue that lack of representation confounds downward accountability as local 
                                                 
3Marshall (2007) refers to Kernaghan’s (1993) characterisation of a collaborative partnership involving a 
public organization as a robust relationship where each party shares decision-making power, gives up some 
autonomy, becomes mutually dependent and contributes resources, money, information or skilled labour. 
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people have no recourse to dismissal or other sanctions if they are dissatisfied with a 
board member’s performance. 
 
Upward accountability is recognised as being paid ‘serious attention’ (Moore & Rockloff 
2006), and while this is widely acknowledged as being necessary and appropriate, the 
manner in which this accountability is being managed has been widely criticised. The 
strict and complex financial accountability processes required by governments place a 
considerable administrative burden on regional organizations, especially those that are 
newly established and still finding their way. Reporting quarterly financial expenditure 
requirements and half-yearly milestone reports has tied up a significant percentage of 
some regional NRM groups’ capacity (Paton et al. 2004). While such problems would be 
expected to recede as institutional processes become routine, they can cause lasting 
disaffection and frustration with the process. Head (2005) argues that this disaffection 
and frustration may undermine the participatory component of regionalism and hamper 
the development of strong horizontal linkages between regional actors by wearing down 
community effort, especially given a heavy reliance on good will and voluntary 
engagement. Beer et al. (2005), ITS Global (2006) and Keogh et al. (2006) argue for a 
reduction of micromanagement by governments and a streamlining of administrative and 
reporting processes. However Griffith et al. (2007) found that it is not always easy to 
determine whether it is state or national government officials that foster micro-
management, each citing evidence of the practice in other governments. 
 
Many authors point to lack of role clarity in various parts of the system as an impediment 
to effective accountability. Further clarification of roles and responsibilities is needed in 
the services supplied by government agencies (Robins & Dovers 2007), bilateral 
agreements (ITS Global 2006, Robins & Dovers 2007) and Joint Steering Committees 
(JSCs) (ITS Global 2006), as well as with the multitude of NRM plans and other 
instruments being used by all levels of government (Lane 2006). Walter Turnbull (2005) 
point to a lack of clarity in the roles, responsibilities, powers and accountabilities of all 
parties involved as well as the inconsistent approaches being taken by jurisdictions in the 
administration and operation of JSCs, and recommend that the Australian and 
state/territory governments clarify and articulate their roles and responsibilities in regard 
to the provision of support to regional bodies. 
 
Inclusiveness 
 
There is a view that regional NRM engagement fails to sufficiently address and resolve 
exclusion of some stakeholders from planning processes, and that some regional actors 
are marginalised from decision-making (Moore 2005, Robins & Dovers 2007). 
Opportunities for participation in NRM also need to reach beyond those stakeholders that 
are articulate and well organised (Lane 2006). Moore & Rockloff (2006) present evidence 
from Victoria and Western Australia that suggests those parts of society well represented 
in regional processes tend to be those actively involved in NRM, specifically those 
involved in farming businesses. In South Australia, Farrelly (2005) found evidence of 
short, non-inclusive consultation processes, and tensions between actors working at the 
local and regional levels. Several authors point to a general failure of regional NRM to 
adequately engage with and accommodate the interests of Indigenous peoples (Lane & 
Corbett 2005, Keogh et al. 2006, Moore & Rockloff 2006, Robins & Dovers 2007). 
Other stakeholders yet to be sufficiently brought into engagement processes include local 
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government and urban communities (Farrelly 2005, Keogh et al. 2006) and non-NRM 
sectors such as tourism (Moore & Rockloff 2006). Insufficient recognition and support 
for voluntary community groups such as Landcare is also a problem for inclusionary 
processes (Paton et al. 2004, Keogh et al. 2006). 
 
Such deficiencies have led to claims that decentralisation and limited localised 
participation in decision-making has entrenched, or may lead to, the domination of local 
elites (Lane et al. 2004a, Lane 2006), so that interest group decision-making overpowers 
wider public deliberation (Morrison & Lane 2006). Regional NRM bodies may be 
representative, but of narrow local interests (Lane et al. 2004a), so that wider societal 
concerns may be neglected (Lane & Corbett 2005). As a consequence, there is a danger 
that regional NRM bodies become parochial in their strategies and priorities and 
dominated by conservative sectoral agendas and an unwillingness to make the hard 
decisions needed to achieving the landscape-scale change required (Lane et al. 2004a, 
Morrison & Lane 2006). Public as well as private goods are involved so means must be 
retained for accounting for the wider public interest (Moore & Rockloff 2006). 
 
ITS Global (2006) on the other hand, regards stakeholder engagement as one of the 
strengths of regional NRM. Pero & Smith (2006) also present evidence that at least some 
regional NRM bodies in Queensland are mounting successful programs to promote and 
achieve multi-sector dialogue and are actively engaging Indigenous communities and 
local government. So in contrast to the conclusions reached by Lane, Morrison and 
Moore in their various papers, Pero & Smith (2006) find that community-based natural 
resource governance will enhance participatory democracy. 
 
Another dimension of inclusiveness is the engagement of regional actors in higher-level 
processes. Walter Turnbull (2005) urge that consideration be given to the inclusion of 
regional NRM board chairs, community and local government representatives on JSCs, a 
measure that would formalise engagement of regional interests in state/territory and 
national decision-making. 
 
Integration 
 
A major theme in the literature is inadequate vertical and horizontal connection and 
coordination that is leading to system-wide dysfunction. For example, Morrison et al. 
(2004) and Bellamy (2007) argue that much NRM planning and practice remains 
fragmented, and that the connections and coherence between NRM and other planning 
regimes is insufficient, with limited coordination across state/territory NRM regulatory, 
planning and policy frameworks. The traditional advocacy role implied by portfolio 
structure of government means that economic, social and environmental agendas are 
poorly integrated (Morrison et al. 2004). Mitchell et al. (2007) also allude to the lack of a 
whole of government approach, where fragmented institutional arrangements tend to 
produce competing interests and objectives. 
 
In the wider context of regional development, Beer et al. (2005) also point to a lack of 
coordination between actors at the local level, lack of a lead agency in strategic planning, 
uncoordinated plans and duplication: 
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Governments often pay lip service to the notion of ‘joined up’ thinking and 
greater cooperation while, at the local level, agencies are left with the harsh 
realities of institutional competition and the job losses which might ensue for 
regional policy practitioners if they fail in this competition (Beer et al. 2005, p. 
56). 
 
Bellamy (2007) also refers to the need to balance cooperation and completion arising 
from organizational self-interest as a key challenge for regional NRM. On the other hand, 
Abrahams (2005) argues that devolving program administration to JSCs has lead to better 
integration of program delivery; that devolving priority-setting to regional NRM bodies 
has improved effective NRM delivery through their integrated regional plans; and that 
integration across government NRM policy and program delivery has been enhanced 
through the Australian Government’s Joint NRM Team. Nonetheless, Keogh et al. (2006) 
are of the view that stronger national leadership is required to bring all the efforts into a 
coordinated program that is delivering something meaningful on the large scale. 
 
Morrison & Lane (2006) use governance fragmentation and lack of coordination as 
grounds to question the worth of the whole regional NRM structure. They point out that it 
is remarkable that there is an expectation that regional NRM will lead to better 
integration, given that the model creates a new layer of governance and therefore entirely 
new boundary problems of inter-jurisdictional coordination and integration for other 
governance authorities involved in NRM: 
 
The creation of regions as units of governance creates new jurisdictions and 
agencies. The ‘boundary problems’ of inter-jurisdictional integration and 
coordination are arguably the biggest problems in environmental management … 
In our view, these problems are not resolved by creating new (regional) units of 
governance, indeed, they may in fact be compounded because they would 
represent an additional layer of government to an already crowded political and 
institutional landscape (Lane et al. 2004b, p. 401). 
 
Morrison et al. (2004) argue that the solution is not a hard-wired strongly connected 
system, but a well-resourced system that recognises the intrinsic necessity for primary 
fragmentation but with wide-ranging secondary integration, with networked partnerships 
based on trust and a clear definition of roles as major features of these arrangements. 
Institutional integration at multiple scales, rather than decentralisation, is also argued as a 
way forward (Lane et al. 2004a). 
 
Head & Ryan (2004a), Head (2005), Lane (2006) and Mitchell et al. (2007) question the 
adequacy of cooperation, coordination and alignment between levels of government and 
point to an absence of seamless frameworks at the state/territory and national levels to 
guide regional NRM bodies. There is also doubt that the various NRM-related 
state/territory planning and implementation regimes across sectors are effectively 
integrated through the regional NRM processes (Head & Ryan 2004a, Head 2005). A 
more integrative NRM system of governance requires structural and procedural reform of 
national and state/territory NRM agencies (Lane 2006). Walter Turnbull (2005) 
recommend the development of a set of protocols that would provide a framework for 
managing the expectations and priorities of both levels of government, and increase 
clarity and certainty to regional bodies about their operating environment. The roles of 
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regional bodies relative to local, state/territory and federal governments need to be 
clarified (Lane 2006) and better linkages are also required between regional planning and 
statutory local government frameworks (Keogh et al. 2006, Robins & Dovers 2007). 
 
Inter-regional cooperation and coordination is also deficient (Robins & Dovers 2007) and 
limited by poorly designed methodologies to underpin integration at this regional scale 
(Paton et al. 2004). There is a need for consistency in planning, financial accountability, 
and monitoring frameworks across the regions (Agriculture and Food Policy Reference 
Group 2006). Better integration of coastal and marine concerns at the regional level is 
also required (Keogh et al. 2006). 
 
On the other hand, Robins & Dovers (2007) regard improved consistency within and 
between states/territories and connections with local government through regional NRM 
board membership as strengths of the regional model. Marshall (2007) also notes that 
mechanisms such as the annual regional NRM bodies’ chairs forum are becoming an 
influential means for horizontal coordination and cooperation. 
 
Capability 
 
The dimensions of capability canvassed in the literature include business systems, 
finance, human resources, knowledge and information management. 
 
Certain components of regional NRM bodies’ business systems are considered to be 
sound, with good practice demonstrated in relation to board operations and processes, 
financial management, and program reporting and monitoring. Human resource 
management, information technology systems and management, codes of conduct, risk 
management, contract management, fraud control and managing conflicts of interest are 
areas where improvement is required (ITS Global 2006). Business process improvement 
is being actively pursued by some regional bodies through self assessment and by 
governments through systems reviews and risk based audits (Griffith et al. 2007). At the 
forefront of this approach is the NRC in NSW, which has developed a quality standard 
for NRM, an audit arrangement and a process for bridging capability gaps. 
 
The adequacy of NRM funding provided by governments and the conditions imposed on 
regional NRM bodies for the use of these funds have attracted extensive comment. Head 
& Ryan (2004b), Morrison et al. (2004) and Head (2005) suggest that despite their 
magnitude, NHT/NAP investment falls short of requirements by a considerable margin. 
On the other hand, Beer et al. (2005) argue that it is not so much the amount of money 
but rather the various ways in which the money is given, either with conditions attached 
or only for limited time periods, which is problematic. 
 
The conditions attached to funding, including constrained time periods for expenditure, 
make it difficult for regional organizations to adopt adaptive planning approaches and 
make strategic investment decisions (Beer et al. 2005). Security of funding is an essential 
ingredient to long-term success (Keogh et al. 2006, Robins & Dovers 2007). Project-led 
funding means that there may be insufficient to support core management, research and 
planning functions (Paton et al. 2004, Beer et al. 2005). Provision of block funding 
without need of investors to micromanage is regarded as the appropriate way forward 
(Keogh et al. 2006). 
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Head (2005) and Lane (2006) question whether many of the new regional NRM bodies 
have the leadership, management and planning skills necessary for delivering on their 
responsibilities. Furthermore, NRM staff are typically on short- to medium-term 
contracts, giving rise to high turnover rates and lack of career development opportunities. 
Such arrangements are antithetical to attracting and retaining high calibre staff and 
building the expertise and skills they need to deliver complex NRM programs. The 
expertise and trust that many staff develop over time is frequently lost when they move 
out of an area to obtain more secure employment. 
 
The leadership and support being provided by governments is also of concern. In the 
early stages of the regional model roll out, inconsistent direction and lack of support from 
government agencies was accompanied by increased reporting requirements and 
inadequate foundation funding for planning (Farrelly 2005). Head (2005) questions the 
effectiveness and timeliness of in-kind provision of expertise by state/territory agencies 
and Marshall (2007) argues that actors at higher levels need to do more to foster 
capacities at the regional level. Farrelly (2005) considers that some of the problems faced 
by regional NRM bodies can be overcome through elevated state assistance with 
resources, knowledge and expertise. Similarly, Keogh et al. (2006) call for more direct 
guidance from governments on governance arrangements, target setting, project 
reporting, as well as on determining priorities for investment, engagement and 
communication. 
 
Information to support effective decision-making is generally deficient (Mitchell et al. 
2007). Many regional bodies lack the capacity to establish effective partnerships with 
scientists to assist them deepen understandings, develop solutions and establish processes 
of continuous learning and improvement (Head 2005). Head & Ryan (2004a) and Lane 
(2006) raise concerns about the scientific rigour of NRM decisions. System-wide, NRM 
governance has not yet delivered institutions in which citizens and experts co-produce the 
knowledge required to address environmental problems (Lane et al. 2004a, Bellamy 
2007). Continued investment is required in researching and delivering high quality 
information to all levels of program delivery, and Keogh et al. (2006) suggest that a 
national brokering unit be established to integrate and deliver research and development 
data and outcomes across the regions. ITS Global (2006) also urge the implementation of 
a more comprehensive and inclusive structure for information and knowledge 
management and exchange between jurisdictions and regional bodies. 
 
Adaptability 
 
Adaptive capacity, widely regarded as crucial to the long-term success of environmental 
management, requires effective mechanisms to implement programs, evaluate 
performance, learn from the outcomes, and revise implementation measures in a 
continuous cycle of planning, implementation and review. Adaptive capability is needed 
at the institutional level, such that governance systems can adapt to or compensate for 
transformative processes (Bellamy 2007), as well as at the level of particular NRM 
interventions and on-ground actions. System-level adaptability is made difficult by the 
previously noted institutional fragmentation, and is critically dependent on the broad 
scope and scale of collaboration amongst and coordination between NRM actors; 
effective management of tensions between competing interests; measures that address 
complex transboundary problems; and application of a more holistic and integrated 
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science (Bellamy 2007). As noted elsewhere in this report, while regional NRM is 
making useful progress in many of these areas, substantial challenges remain. 
 
There is also evidence that regional actors are struggling to embrace the adaptive model. 
The most detailed study of adaptive management in regional NRM bodies was 
undertaken by Allan & Curtis (2005). They found that NRM actions could have been 
seen as management ‘experiments’, as required by the adaptive approach, but were not 
because they were funded by ‘implementation’ money rather than ‘research’ money. 
There appeared to be no expectation of learning from funded works, because there was 
no systematic monitoring or evaluation of most of the activities. Three sites (of hundreds) 
did have specific monitoring regimes, but these were established with the stated intention 
of demonstrating effective practices, rather than learning from them. There is a: 
 
natural resource management culture that values activity, control, comfort, and 
clarity over reflection, learning, and embracing complexity and variability. The 
poor fit of adaptive management with current natural resource management 
culture goes a long way to explaining why managers have failed to use adaptive 
management, even when it is officially encouraged (Allan & Curtis 2005, p. 423). 
 
ITS Global (2006) agrees that effective regional-level monitoring and evaluation 
frameworks and performance reporting systems need to be developed so that the efficacy 
of investments in NRM can be assessed. They urge that the framework should 
concentrate on a core set of indicators that have a high probability of accounting for 
multiple outcomes and are linked to social and economic elements. A focus on outputs 
rather than outcomes has been hindering learning (Paton et al. 2004). 
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5.  SYNTHESIS OF INTERVIEW DATA AND THE LITERATURE 
 
In this section we consider the common ground and points of divergence between the 
views expressed by our interview participants and the assertions and findings offered in 
the literature. As our participant data were drawn from three states, and as it would be 
inappropriate for us to make comment on the situation outside these jurisdictions, in this 
section we use ‘state’ to refer to NSW, Victoria and Tasmania, except where there are 
obvious system-wide implications. 
 
Regional participants were ambivalent about the legislative base of regional NRM. On 
the one hand, they appreciated the legitimacy conferred by legislation, but on the other, 
they sought to earn legitimacy in the eyes of regional stakeholders by developing 
strategies that differentiate them from government. The wide-spread reliance on 
incentive-based instruments also means that earned legitimacy is essential to the effective 
functioning of regional NRM bodies. Participants and academics agreed that there has 
been insufficient devolution of powers to regional NRM bodies by governments, with 
trust (by governments) being emphasised by interview participants, while socio-political 
analyses underpinned academics’ arguments. Academics argued that the principle of 
subsidiarity should apply, whereby devolution should occur such that tasks can be 
undertaken at the least centralised level of governance that has the (potential) capacity to 
satisfactorily complete them, while representing all actors with an interest at this level. 
This position is broadly consistent with the views of regional participants. 
 
However, academics and participants diverged in relation to the adequacy of democratic 
representation. Participants regarded the appointment of regional NRM boards on the 
basis of expertise and/or sectoral background as a strength of the current system, whereas 
several academics argued that this compromises democratic legitimacy, particularly given 
the absence of any formal mechanisms for downward accountability. There is a parallel 
here in the concern raised by some participants that regional bodies themselves, and the 
communities in which they are located, had no say in the design of the system. 
Nonetheless, several regional participants considered that community acceptance of 
regional NRM is a strength that continues to be built through communication, 
engagement and partnerships. In this sense, formal accountability to regional 
communities may not be necessary as long as regional NRM bodies can demonstrate a 
high level of earned legitimacy, although in some regions this has yet to be achieved. 
 
Another element of system design, the boundary definitions of the 56 regions, was not a 
significant concern for most participants but did attract criticism from academics, with 
arguments that some ‘regions’ lack coherent social, economic or biophysical foundations. 
We agree that some revision may be desirable, but at this stage of system maturity, any 
significant alteration to regional boundaries in NSW, Victoria or Tasmania would 
probably cause more disruption to established and emergent structures and relationships 
than could be justified by any potential gains in social, economic and biophysical 
coherence. 
 
Given that many NRM issues require action at supra-regional scales, we agree with 
academics’ calls for multi-level nesting of institutional responsibilities. To a large extent, 
such structures are already evident in the system with action taking place at regional, state 
and national levels, as well as by cross-regional entities in the Murray-Darling Basin and 
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elsewhere (Bellamy 2007). However, the communication between and coordination of 
these structures is poorly developed – a point we return to below in the context of system 
integration. 
 
Given the above, we support greater devolution of powers and autonomy to regional 
NRM bodies, but at the same time agree with those academics who caution against 
diminution of governments’ legitimate responsibilities to represent extra-regional 
interests and erosion of their capability to address national and international concerns and 
obligations. Further decentralisation of authority for regional NRM bodies to address 
NRM issues at the regional level should therefore be accompanied by retention or even 
strengthening of governments’ commitments and capabilities to manage NRM concerns 
at jurisdictional levels. 
 
In this context, we note regional concern about the impact of rapid policy changes on 
regional ability to establish mature systems and to sustain community effort and 
engagement, as well as apparent poor performance of some government agencies cited by 
participants, reflecting a failure of those agencies to earn legitimacy from regional NRM 
bodies. Both the haphazard performance of some state agencies in terms of service 
delivery, and their apparent lack of awareness or consideration of how their actions affect 
specific regional NRM programs, undermine the credibility of the regional model 
amongst some local communities and hamper the effectiveness of regional action. 
Equally, regional NRM bodies need to recognise and respect the legitimacy of 
governments’ roles in the multilayer NRM governance system. 
 
Although there are exceptions, relationships are generally well-developed and 
constructive between regional NRM bodies and their respective state NRM agencies and 
with the Australian Government; between regional NRM bodies and Australian 
Government NRM staff; and between state government NRM staff and Australian 
Government NRM staff. These connections are testament to the good will and 
commitment of individuals, rather than the structures and processes within which they are 
operating. Throughout the system, personal integrity is in the main acceptable, in some 
cases exemplary, and the commitment of regional decision makers, as well as some 
stakeholders, is a strong point of regional NRM. However, there is a need to consolidate 
and in some cases strengthen government agency contributions to NRM governance and 
service delivery. 
 
Regional NRM bodies generally considered that their processes and responses to ‘conflict 
of interest’ issues were sound, and that probity-related matters were being effectively 
managed through codes of practice, training and procedures. The systems and culture are 
generally in place to support the integrity of regional NRM boards and staff. Participants 
also indicated a generally solid transparency performance, with a range of communication 
media being used, often targeted to particular audiences and needs, although regions that 
are less mature or relatively resource-poor recognised a need for improvement. 
Transparency has not been raised as an issue in the literature. 
 
Upward accountability was universally accepted by participants and in the literature as an 
essential component of good governance. Performance of the partner regions was very 
good, with auditing and reporting of finances, project management and resource 
allocations generally well established. However, participants, academics and consultants 
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all commented on the unnecessarily complex and demanding reporting requirements 
imposed by governments. These place a considerable administrative burden on regional 
organizations, especially those that are relatively new. There is a need to reduce 
micromanagement by governments and streamline administrative and reporting 
processes. 
 
Participants, academics and consultants were in agreement that role clarity is 
problematic, both at a systems level and for particular NRM activities such as water, 
native vegetation and pest plant and animal management. Further clarification of roles, 
responsibilities and accountabilities is needed for all organizations involved in Australian 
NRM, as well as the status and functions of the various strategic plans and operational 
instruments. 
 
Downward accountability, which was a major theme in the academic literature, received 
little direct attention in the participant interviews, although to some extent such matters 
were dealt with in the context of inclusiveness. Academics argued that if regional bodies 
are not downwardly accountable to locals, as well as upwardly to governments, then 
decentralisation will not yield more effective and democratic natural resource 
management, nor establish their ‘community-based’ credentials. As noted above, we do 
not altogether agree with this view, in the sense that we doubt that there is a governance 
advantage in moving to an electoral model of regional representation. We accept regional 
participants’ view that there are advantages to having board members appointed on the 
basis of their expertise and sectoral knowledge. We saw no evidence to suggest that, in 
our partner regions at least, there was any significant capture of decision-making by 
sectoral interests. We also note the strengthening degree of earned legitimacy being 
claimed by the regions, as well as their clear commitment to inclusive governance 
practices. However, this is only a preliminary conclusion, as we did not interview parties 
who are currently outside the system, and we recognise that this is a potentially 
significant limitation to our methodology. 
 
All participants appear strongly committed to inclusive governance, and some regions 
considered this a strength of their current arrangements. However, both participants and 
academics noted that establishing effective engagement with several key stakeholders – 
Indigenous communities, ‘care’ groups, local governments, agribusiness, urban and 
environmental constituencies – remains a significant challenge. The academic view that 
engagement fails to sufficiently address and resolve exclusion of some stakeholders is 
therefore correct insofar as it represents the current status of regional NRM, but fails to 
recognise that regional and state government actors are well aware of this, and are 
progressively implementing remedial measures. These measures constitute a long-term 
project that appears to be heading in the right direction. 
 
While in some sense our regional participants may be regarded as ‘local elites’, we do not 
consider that they are complicit in initiatives or processes to entrench their power – in 
many cases quite the contrary – we suspect that given their apparent genuine commitment 
to inclusiveness, most regional board members and staff would welcome other regional 
players taking on larger roles and sharing the massive job they face. We agree that wider 
societal concerns may continue to be under-represented at the regional level, but as noted 
above, this demands a strengthening of the system as a whole, as it is at the state and 
national levels where such concerns are best represented and pursued. 
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Another dimension of inclusiveness is the engagement of regional actors in higher-level 
processes. Regional participants clearly feel that this is currently inadequate, and we 
agree with Walter Turnbull (2005) that inclusion of regional NRM representatives in 
higher-level coordination and decision-making is a desirable governance reform. 
 
The charge by some academics that regional NRM may be unwilling or unable to make 
the hard decisions needed to achieve landscape-scale change is a legitimate one. 
However, we see nothing in the dynamics of a more fully devolved and formally 
downwardly accountable system, as being advocated by some academics, which would 
resolve this issue. Again, the way forward here seems to be a more assertive policy stance 
from governments that gives added weight to system-wide environmental interests and 
imperatives. In NSW, the NRC is providing leadership in his regard through its standard 
and CAP reviews. 
 
Our reading of participants’ responses is that process fairness is in place at the regional 
level, with procedures that generally ensure consistency and absence of bias in decision-
making. The main fairness issue still outstanding is the tension between a strategic 
approach and the fact that benefits from NRM investments are disproportionately 
allocated to particular areas and sectors. However, the proposition that a strategic and 
targeted approach is more appropriate than trying to spread effort evenly between and 
within regions was universally accepted by participants, and the academic literature did 
not offer a contrary view. Regional NRM bodies should continue to strengthen their 
communication regarding the justifications for a targeted investment approach, as well as 
continuing to bring opportunities for attracting support outside priority areas to 
stakeholders’ attention. 
 
Alignment of broad NRM direction across national, state and regional levels generally 
appears sound. The same cannot be said for the structures and processes that are charged 
with delivering on these directions, and as noted above, there are also gaps in the policy 
framework in some jurisdictions. There has been a failure on the part of state and 
Australian governments to both develop a coherent and integrated NRM policy 
framework, and to implement this in a way that does not undermine advances being made 
at the regional level. 
 
A major theme in both participants’ comments and the literature (the exceptions noted by 
Abrahams (2005) notwithstanding) is inadequate vertical and horizontal connection and 
coordination that are causing sub-optimal system-wide performance. Integration of NRM 
policy and action across national, state and regional levels is patchy and, where present, is 
often superficial. Connection between and coherence with NRM and other planning 
regimes is insufficient, with limited coordination in state NRM regulatory, planning and 
policy frameworks. National and state leadership is required to bring all the efforts into a 
coordinated program that is delivering significant large-scale outcomes. 
 
Integration between regional NRM bodies and local government planning is on the 
agenda for some regions, although little substantive progress has been made, while other 
regions consider the current separation of planning roles as appropriate. The relationship 
between local government and NRM planning warrants further research. Horizontal 
integration between CMAs is patchy, but strengthening through fora involving regional 
board chairs and general managers. However, cross-jurisdictional integration at the 
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regional level remains limited, and participants from all three states point to competition 
between regions as a significant barrier – one maintained by the current neo-liberal 
political milieu described in the literature, despite the partnership rhetoric that pervades 
government characterisations of regional NRM. Nonetheless, participants offered 
numerous examples of effective partnerships and projects between regional NRM bodies 
and other regional NRM providers. The tensions and contradictions arising from the 
competitive business environment in which regions operate and the imperative for 
partnership building are an ongoing governance challenge for regional NRM bodies. 
 
Participants indicated that regional NRM bodies generally have well-established business 
systems, and those that do have deficiencies make it a priority to remedy shortcomings. 
Consultants agreed that board operations and processes, financial management, and 
program reporting and monitoring are sound, but improvements were required in human 
resource management, information technology systems, codes of conduct, risk 
management, contract management, fraud control and managing conflicts of interest. We 
note that in some regions rapid progress has been made to remedy the identified 
deficiencies since these conclusions were reached, and some of the required 
improvements are now in place, although the relative maturity of regional NRM bodies is 
still a key influence on the establishment of good-practice systems. 
 
While some academics have questioned whether many regional NRM bodies have the 
leadership, management and planning skills necessary for delivering on their 
responsibilities, we found the general calibre of boards and staff to be very high, although 
remote and chronically under-resourced regions continue to be disadvantaged. Where a 
particular skill is needed, regions are often finding ways to access the necessary expertise, 
particularly through partnership arrangements. Nonetheless, government imposed 
operational and resource limitations have contributed to the high turnover rates and lack 
of career development opportunities experienced by regions. As noted above, the 
leadership and support being provided by governments is also of concern. 
 
Not surprisingly, a lack of financial resources was raised by both academics and regional 
participants as a significant capability deficit. It was also recognised that the manner in 
which funding is delivered and constrained by governments makes it difficult for regional 
organizations to make strategic long-term investments; support core management, 
research and planning functions; and impairs their ability to adopt adaptive planning 
approaches. As with conferring more substantive powers, trust by governments in 
regional NRM bodies was identified as a key requirement for the establishment of more 
durable and flexible funding arrangements. The strongly developed business systems that 
are now in place in most regions provide a basis for governments to grant regional NRM 
bodies the financial autonomy they seek. 
 
Participants recognised that knowledge management systems, an essential ingredient of 
NRM capability, are generally of limited effectiveness and in some cases poorly 
developed. State NRM agencies were identified as the key governance layer that could 
develop and coordinate the delivery of such products. We found no support in the regions 
investigated for academic claims that many regional bodies lack the capacity to establish 
effective partnerships with scientists. And although concerns about the scientific rigour 
of NRM decisions raised by academics have some resonance with participants’ 
comments, decision-makers in the more mature regions have demonstrated a capability to 
 52 
access and employ available knowledge. The issue is that system-wide there are not yet 
the institutions by which citizens and experts can co-produce the knowledge required to 
address complex environmental problems. Establishing such institutions is a major long-
term challenge for all parties involved – governments, research providers and regional 
NRM bodies – if the NRM system is to fulfil its adaptive potential. 
 
The importance of establishing regional NRM bodies as learning organizations was 
widely recognised by participants and academics. However, few regions have fully 
operational systems. State and national level processes are also under-developed; this is a 
major weakness of the current governance structures. Again, in NSW the NRC is making 
a significant contribution in this regard. Some participants showed awareness that while 
MER systems provide for accountability, they should also be designed to give their 
organizations an adaptive management capacity. In general, current MER systems are 
insufficient to seriously embrace active adaptive management. A focus on outputs rather 
than outcomes is also hindering learning, particularly given the cumbersome and time 
consuming amendment processes required by the Australian Government to vary 
activities. Given that these deficiencies are a common across the system, there is a role 
here for governments to provide leadership in the design and implementation of such 
structures and procedures. Academic work has identified the cultural and institutional 
conditions that are antagonistic to such a system, and thus emphasised the extent of the 
challenge ahead. 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
 
While there is some dissent in the academic literature, the overwhelming view of our 
interview participants, with which we are in accord, is that the structure of the regional 
delivery model is generally sound and the model should be allowed time to fulfil its 
potential. For this to occur, however, significant advances are required in several aspects 
of system and regional level governance. In this regard, we note that there appears to be a 
high level of commitment to the regional NRM approach and a willingness to meet the 
challenges. 
 
Not surprisingly, there is considerable overlap in the issues facing regional NRM bodies. 
Some of the variability is due to maturity, which affects organization and use of business 
systems, engagement, and outcomes, as well as variation in jurisdictional arrangements. 
In this section we summarise the main findings from our analyses of interviews with key 
players and the literature. As throughout this report, we present these findings according 
to our eight principles of good governance. 
 
Principle 1. Legitimacy 
 
The legitimacy of the regional NRM system is moderate. Regional NRM bodies are faced 
with the challenge of managing tensions between legitimacy conferred on them by 
governments, and a perceived need to be recognised as separate from government in 
order to earn legitimacy from their communities4. Autonomy is a real concern. There has 
been insufficient devolution of powers to regional NRM bodies by the Australian 
Government and some state governments, with trust by governments being a key issue. 
There were divergent views about the adequacy of democratic representation at the 
regional level. Participants regarded the appointment of regional NRM boards on the 
basis of expertise and/or sectoral background as a strength of the current system, whereas 
several academics argued that this compromises democratic legitimacy, particularly given 
the absence of any formal mechanisms for downward accountability. In our view, formal 
accountability to regional communities may not be necessary as long as regional NRM 
bodies can demonstrate a high level of earned legitimacy, though in some regions this has 
yet to be achieved. 
 
While we support greater devolution of powers and autonomy to regional NRM bodies, 
this should not diminish governments’ legitimate responsibilities to represent extra-
regional interests or erode their capability to address national and international concerns 
and obligations. Retention or even strengthening of governments’ commitments and 
capabilities to manage higher-level NRM concerns should accompany further 
decentralisation of authority to regional NRM bodies. 
 
Throughout the system, personal integrity of the key players appears sound, with the 
commitment of regional decision makers, as well as some stakeholders, a key strength of 
                                                 
4A NSW Government agency staff member, in commenting on an earlier draft of this report, challenged the 
notion that regional NRM bodies need to deny formal associations with state governments. S/he believes 
that this perception has been encouraged to focus community attention on the Australian Government as 
funding provider, when in fact the NSW Government, for example, are also investing heavily in regional 
NRM. This may be the case, but we still consider that the tension between community acceptance and status 
as an arm of government is a real one. 
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regional NRM. Processes and responses to ‘conflict of interest’ issues are sound, and 
probity-related matters are being effectively managed through codes of practice, training 
and procedures. Questions linger, however, over the genuineness of some governments’ 
commitment to NRM. There is a need to consolidate and in some cases strengthen 
government agency contributions to NRM governance and service delivery. 
 
Principle 2. Transparency 
 
The transparency of regional NRM bodies is strong. A range of communication and 
reporting media is used often targeted to particular audiences and needs, though regions 
that are less mature or relatively resource-poor recognise a need for improvement. 
 
Principle 3. Accountability 
 
The accountability of the regional NRM system is moderate. The importance of upward 
accountability of regional NRM bodies to government is well established through 
auditing and reporting of finances, project management and resource allocations. 
However, reporting requirements imposed by governments are unnecessarily complex 
and demanding. There is a need to reduce government micromanagement and streamline 
administrative and reporting processes. 
 
Role clarity is a key accountability weakness, both at a systems level and for particular 
NRM activities such as water, native vegetation and pest plant and animal management. 
Further clarification of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities is needed for all 
organizations involved in Australian NRM, as well as the status and functions of the 
various strategic plans and operational instruments. 
 
Downward accountability of regional NRM bodies to their communities is required for 
democratic NRM governance. As noted under legitimacy, we doubt that there is a 
governance advantage in providing this accountability through an electoral model of 
regional representation, and instead recommend a focus on further strengthening earned 
legitimacy and inclusive governance practices. 
 
Principle 4. Inclusiveness 
 
The inclusiveness of the regional NRM system is moderate. All participants were 
strongly committed to inclusive governance, and some regions considered this a strong 
point of their current arrangements. However, both participants and academics noted that 
establishing effective engagement with several key stakeholders – Indigenous 
communities, ‘care’ groups, local governments, agribusiness, urban and environmental 
constituencies – remains a significant challenge. Engagement of regional actors in higher-
level processes is currently inadequate, and inclusion of regional NRM representatives in 
higher-level coordination and decision-making is a desirable governance reform. Wider 
societal and environmental concerns tend to be under-represented at the regional level – 
this demands a strengthening of the system as a whole, as it is at the state and national 
levels where such concerns are best represented and pursued. 
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Principle 5. Fairness 
 
The fairness of regional NRM bodies is moderate to strong. Decision-making procedures 
generally ensure consistency and absence of bias in decision-making. The tension 
between a strategic approach and the disproportionate allocation of NRM benefits across 
areas and sectors remains a concern. While the proposition that a strategic and targeted 
approach is more appropriate than trying to spread effort evenly between and within 
regions seems appropriate, the use of formal procedures to track, justify and 
communicate the distribution of costs and benefits arising from NRM decisions is 
desirable. Extending the application of procedures that, on the one hand, provide for 
effective conflict management and, on the other, foster a culture in which mutual respect, 
active listening, honesty, as well as lack of distortion, manipulation and deception 
become the norm could also advance governance fairness. 
 
Principle 6. Integration 
 
The integration of the regional NRM system is weak to moderate. Alignment of broad 
NRM direction across national, state and regional levels generally appears sound. 
Unfortunately the same cannot be said for the structures and processes that are charged 
with delivering on these directions. While communication, if not coordination, between 
some regions, state NRM agencies, and Australian Government NRM staff, is well 
developed and apparently constructive, inadequate vertical and horizontal connection and 
coordination is leading to sub-optimal system-wide performance. Integration of NRM 
policy and action across national, state and regional levels is patchy, and where present, 
often superficial. Connection between and coherence with NRM and other planning 
regimes is insufficient, with limited coordination in state NRM regulatory, planning and 
policy frameworks. National and state leadership is required to bring all the efforts into a 
coordinated program that is delivering significant large-scale outcomes. 
 
Horizontal integration between CMAs is patchy, but strengthening through fora involving 
regional board chairs and general managers. However, cross-jurisdictional integration at 
the regional level is limited, and competition between regions remains a barrier. 
Nonetheless, effective partnerships and projects between regional NRM bodies and with 
other regional NRM providers are being developed. The tensions and contradictions 
arising from the competitive business environment in which regions operate and the 
imperative for partnership building are an ongoing governance challenge for regional 
NRM bodies. 
 
Principle 7. Capability 
 
The capability of the regional NRM system is moderate to weak. Regional NRM bodies 
generally have well-established business systems, and those that do have deficiencies are 
making it a priority to remedy the shortcomings. Board and staff members of regional 
NRM bodies are generally high calibre and experienced, although remote and chronically 
under-resourced regions continue to be disadvantaged in attracting and retaining suitably 
qualified staff. Government imposed operational and resource limitations have 
contributed to the high turnover rates and lack of career development opportunities 
experienced by regions. The leadership and support being provided by governments is 
also of concern. 
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The current level of investment in NRM continues to produce a significant capability 
deficit, but even more important is the manner in which funding is delivered and 
constrained by governments. More durable and flexible funding arrangements are needed 
so that regional NRM bodies can make strategic long-term investments; adequately 
support core management, research and planning functions; and adopt adaptive planning 
and management approaches. The strongly developed business systems that are now in 
place in most regions provide a basis for governments to grant regional NRM bodies the 
financial autonomy they need. 
 
Knowledge management systems are generally of limited effectiveness and in some cases 
poorly developed. State NRM agencies were identified as the key governance layer that 
needs to develop and coordinate the delivery of such products. System-wide there are not 
yet the institutions by which citizens and experts can co-produce the knowledge required 
to address environmental problems. This is a major long-term challenge for all parties 
involved: governments, research providers and regional NRM bodies. 
 
Principle 8. Adaptability 
 
The adaptability of the regional NRM system is moderate to weak. System-level 
adaptability is made difficult by cumbersome and time-consuming amendment processes, 
institutional fragmentation and related transboundary issues, tensions between competing 
interests, and poorly integrated knowledge generation and management. While the 
importance of establishing regional NRM bodies as learning organizations is widely 
recognised, few regions have fully operational systems. State and national level processes 
are also under-developed. This is a major weakness of the current governance structures. 
Though current and emerging MER systems provide for accountability, they are 
insufficient to give their organizations an operational adaptive management capacity. 
Given that this is system-wide issue, there is a role for governments to provide leadership 
in the design and implementation of such structures and procedures, and a need for all 
organizations to tackle the current antagonistic cultural and institutional conditions. 
 
Finally, readers should interpret the conclusions presented in this report taking into 
account that they principally apply to the nine partner regions and related state 
jurisdictions, as well as certain aspects of Australian Government involvement in the 
system. We do not make any claims about their applicability to the 47 other regional 
NRM bodies and other state and territory jurisdictions. 
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APPENDIX 1.  INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Introductory statements 
 
• Briefly go over the information sheet 
• Verbal account of the project – running sheet based on inside front cover of report 
• Define governance – state definition from Report 1 
 
Question Set 1 
Given our description of ‘governance’, which elements of NRM governance are you 
doing well at? How do you know you are doing well? 
 
Probes as needed: 
• How are power and responsibilities distributed and exercised? 
• How are decisions taken? 
• How do people have their say? 
 
Which elements of NRM governance, if any, is the [CMA body, State Agency, Australian 
Government Agency] doing well at?  How do you know they are doing well? 
 
Question Set 2 
What are the key challenges for NRM governance that are faced by your [CMA body, 
State Agency, Australian Government Agency]?  
 
Probes as needed: 
• Can you say more about that? 
• Who was involved? 
• Did you raise that concern with that [CMA body, State Agency, Australian 
Government Agency]? 
• What was their response? 
• Can you think of any other challenges [Probe from the principles where 
appropriate]? 
 
Have you addressed any of these NRM governance challenges? 
 
IF YES 
How? How effective do you think this response has been? How did you or how would you 
judge the effectiveness of this response? 
 
IF NO 
Why not? What would help you to make a response? 
 
Question Set 3 
Have you read our report on good governance principles for regional NRM? 
 
IF YES 
Do you agree with them? Are they all needed? Is there anything missing? 
 
